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INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION
The Grand Jury. In approximately half the States as well as in Eng-
land use of the grand jury as an investigative body," and of grand jury
indictment as a step in prosecution,7 2 has been largely abandoned.
This old institution has, however, been retained in federal practice
pretty much in the traditional common law form. The new Rules do
not change this as, indeed, they could not in view of the constitutional
guaranty that no federal prosecution for a "capital, or otherwise in-
famous" crime (in practice, any felony) 3 shall be had save on "present-
ment or indictment" 74 by a grand jury. The extensive use of federal
grand juries for investigative purposes would, moreover, militate
against any curtailment of their powers in this respect even if such
action were within the Supreme Court's power to prescribe "rules of
pleading, practice, and procedure." The place of grand juries in the
* A continuation of The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: I (1946) 55 YALE
L. J. 694.
t Lines Professor of Law, Yale University; Member of the United States Supreme
Court Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure.
71. For a discussion of the investigative role of the grand jury, and of alternatives to!.its
use, see Dession and Cohen, The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries (1932) 41 YALE
L. J. 687.
72. See Dession, From Indictment to Informnation-Implications of the Shift (1932) 42
YALE L. J. 163.
73. Duke v. United States, 301 U.S. 492 (1937); United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S.
433 (1922); Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417 (1885); American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
147 F. (2d) 93 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944), aff'd, 66 Sup. Ct. 1125 (U. S. 1946), (1945) 54 YALE
L. J. 707.
74. U. S. CoNsT. AsmEND. V. The "presentment"-as distinguished from an indictment
-is nowhere mentioned or provided for in the Rules, being considered obsolete. See Com-
mittee Note to Rule 7 in FEDERAL RuLEs OF Canxn1.u PROCEDURE, SECOND PREL111ARY
DRAr (1944) 26.
The Rules are likewise silent on the related problem of grand jury "reports." The legal
status and use of such reports generally in the United States, and at common law, are re-
viewed in Dession and Cohen, The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries (1932) 41 YLE
L. J. 687, 689.
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federal apparatus of investigation-which includes legislative com-
mittees and administrative agencies similarly endowed with subpoena
power, as well as prosecuting attorneys and police officers-is accord-
ingly unaltered, and since most of the common federal offenses are
felonies, the process of indictment will continue as a routine step in the
initiation of most prosecutions.
Rule 6, however, does settle certain hitherto disputed points, and in
several respects enhances the effectiveness of the grand jury by per-
mitting greater flexibility in its use. As formerly, a grand jury consists
of not less than 16 nor more than 23 members, 16 constituting a quo-
rum.75 Previous statutes relating to qualifications and exemptions of
grand jurors are also undisturbed. 71 Subdivision (a) states that the
court shall direct that a sufficient number of qualified persons be
brought in to meet the requirement (a matter with respect to which
there has been some diversity of practice) 7 and also provides a new
flexibility with respect to the number of grand juries which may be
convened at any given time. Formerly there could be no more than
three functioning simultaneously in the Southern District of New York,
no more than two at any given place of holding court in any other dis-
trict containing a city or borough of at least 300,000 population, and
elsewhere but one. 78 Under this restriction the government was con-
stantly pressed, in some of the busier districts, to find sufficient grand
jury time, while in others, grand juries met only infrequently and then
had little business to transact. The Rule now provides that the court
"shall order one or more grand juries to be summoned at such times as
the public interest requires."
A similar flexibility with respect to the permissible period of service
of a grand jury is effected by subdivision (g) of Rule 6:
"A grand jury shall serve until discharged by the court but no
grand jury may serve more than 18 months. The tenure and pow-
ers of a grand jury are not affected by the beginning or expiration
of a term of court. At any time for cause shown the court may ex-
75. Rule 6(a) substantially restates 36 STAT. 1165 (1911)g 28 U. S. C. § 419 (1940).
76. See 36 STAT. 1164 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §§ 411-26 (1940), and the Committee Note to
Rule 6(a).
77. See Address by Medalie, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE wimT No s
AND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS (1946) 151 (hereafter cited as NoTEs A INSTITUTF PRto-
CEEDINGS): "in some places the marshal brings in 23 grand jurors; and in other places the
court directs or the marshal brings in-it all depends on how it comes about-a greater num-
ber of persons from whom 23 will be selected. This gives the'courts, the marshals, everybody
else concerned, a definite indication that you can bring enough in, as is the practice in the
Southern District of New York, to allow for absences, disabilities and everything else to
take care of that, and from the group you select your 23."
78. 36 STAT. 1165 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 421 (1940), as construed in Morris v. United
States, 128 F. (2d) 912 (C. C. A. 5th, 1942); United States v. Perlsten, 39 F. Supp, 965
(D. N. J. 1941).
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cuse a juror either temporarily or permanently, and in the latter
event the court may impanel another person in place of the juror
excused."
Previously a grand jury's term expired automatically with the close of
the term of court unless continued by affirmative order;7 and while
continuance up to a maximum of 18 months was permissible, a grand
jury so continued was confined to investigations commenced during
the original term.s The change brings grand jury practice into adjust-
ment with the realities of lengthy and involved investigations, and is in
harmony with the general elimination, by Rule 45(c), of the term of
court as a time limitation."' Needless to say, grand juries will not be
held for 18 months without real need.
Errors in the impaneling of a grand jury, including the disqualifica-
tion of an individual juror, may be raised in either of two ways: by a
challenge under Rule 6(b)(1), or, if the issue has not previously been
determined upon challenge, by a motion under 6(b)(2) to dismiss the
indictment.
The grounds for challenges and for a motion to dismiss are the same.
Objection may be made to the whole array of jurors "on the ground
that the grand jury was not selected, drawn, or summoned in accord-
ance with law," or to individual jurors on the ground that they are not
"legally qualified." An indictment will only be dismissed on the latter
ground, however, if less than twelve jurors, after deducting the number
not legally qualified, concurred in finding the indictment. Neither
ground, it will be noted, is limited to bias. A grand jury may not be
"selected, drawn or summoned in accordance with law" even though
all of its members are quite unbiased. The qualifications of individual
jurors, on the other hand, are still governed by state law, and while
the state statutes vary widely, none is limited to the exclusion of bias
alone. They seek also to insure that persons selected as jurors will be
of sufficient intelligence, education and experience to be able to evalu-
ate the evidence and understand the proceedings (requirements as to
age, sanity, formal education, etc.), that they will be possessed of a
measure of responsibility (requirements as to citizenship, residence,
taxpaying, lack of criminal record, etc.), and that they will be in a posi-
tion to contribute the necessary time without undue harassment or
imposition (requirements that the juror shall not have served on any
other jury within a stated time, that he shall not be engaged in certain
professions and occupations, etc.) -82
79. 13 STAT. 500 (1865), 18 U. S. C. § 554 (1940).
80. See United States v. Johnson, 319 U. S. 503 (1942). Controversies of the technical
nature therein presented should now be obviated.
81. This was done for the civil side of the courts by Rule 6(c), F. R. Crv. P.
82. See 36 STAT. 1165 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §§ 411-26 (1940), and the Committee Note to
Rule 6(a).
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The provision for challenges continues the previously established
practice. 3 They may be made by either the government attorney or a
,defendant who has been held to answer, but not by a person who merely
expects to be indicted. Although challenges must be made before the
administration of the oath to the jurors, the Rule provides neither that
defendants held for action by the grand jury shall be notified of the
time and place of the impaneling nor that defendants in custody shall
be brought to court to attend at the impaneling. A further difficulty in
the way of interposing challenges in a busy district where several grand
juries may be impaneled simultaneously has been suggested by the late
Judge Medalie:
"Here is the difficulty that I see, and I don't know any way in
which we can meet it. In this district, you can have three grand
juries running at once, and in any district where you have more
than one grand jury running at.once in the same place, how can you
tell which grand jury to object to, either by challenge to the array
or a challenge to an individual juror for disqualification. . . . [t]o
make a surer job of it, you ought to go out, if you are representing
a defendant who has been held to answer, and challenge every
grand jury that comes along." 84
Failure to challenge does not, however, constitute a waiver of any ob-
jection.
The wisdom of retaining any provision for challenging grand jurors
has been questioned by some on the ground that grand juries do not
determine guilt or innocence, and that "a trial on the question of par-
tiality of the grand jury in advance of the trial of the indictment" will
offer "abounding opportunities for pettifogging tactics." 85 However,
challenges in most districts have been rather rare. The thought in per-
petuating the possibility is that if a grand jury happens to be illegally
constituted, it is better that the defect be discovered and remedied at
the outset rather than invoked later to invalidate a whole series of
otherwise well-founded indictments. The substantial question behind
the elimination or retention of challenges would seem to be whether
defects in the qualifications of a grand jury should afford a basis for
dismissing an indictment.
The provision for testing the array and the qualifications of indi-
vidual grand jurors after return of an indictment is in accord with the
83. Agnew v. United States, 165 U. S. 36 (1897); Clawson v. United States, 114 U. S,
477 (1885); United States v. Gale, 109 U. S. 65 (1883).
84. NoTEs AND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS (1946) 151-2.
85. See, e.g., Assistant Attorney General Berge, The Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure (Paper prepared as Basis for Discussion at Judicial Conference of the Third Cir-
cuit, Sept. 24, 1943) 12-13.
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former practice permitting this by motion to quash the indictment 15
or by plea in abatementY The one change, that one now proceeds by
motion to dismiss, is consistent with the general elimination by Rule 12
of pleas in abatement, demurrers, and motions to quash.
The importance which may be attached to compliance with the
standards prescribed for the selection and qualification of grand jurors
depends not only on one's conception of the role of the grand jury in
law administration but also on one's position on a more fundamental
issue of criminal policy which transcends the question at hand and cuts
across most of the problems of criminal procedure: the much debated
issue as to when violation of a procedural standard warrants reversal of
an otherwise valid conviction. The debate flared up anew over the
McNabb decision in the Supreme Court. The states are split on the
same broad issue as it arises in cases of illegal Search and Seizure," and
courts generally are confronted with this issue almost daily in the whole
gamut of situations which call for decision whether an "error" com-
mitted in the course of successful prosecution of an apparently guilty
defendant, and of which he complains, may be deemed "harmless." ,.
We are, however, committed by the Constitution to grand jury par-
ticipation in the accusatory process in all federal felony cases--save
where a defendant voluntarily waives indictment. One may, like Ray-
mond Moley and the members of the Xickersham Commission some
years ago, regard this as a nuisance. Prosecutors understandably prefer
to write their own tickets in all but the infrequent cases where an oppor-
tunity to delegate responsibility may be welcome. It is commonly
argued that grand juries more often than not "rubberstamp" bills of
indictment, and that on the rare occasions when they do "run away"
they are likely to exercise poor judgment. Such contentions are not
altogether unfounded in the experience of any prosecutor; it is true
that grand juries in the urban communities of today hardly perform the
same function as the old "grand inquest" of the rural English county,
indicting on common knowledge, in the days before public prosecutors
or highly organized police forces existed.91 Nevertheless, popular par-
86. Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442,444 (1900); Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 592, 593
(1896).
87. Crowley v. United States, 194 U. S. 461, 462 (1904); Agnew v. United States, 165
U. S. 36, 40 (1897); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 146 (1878).
88. See Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: I (1946) 55 YA.E L. J.
695, 707-13.
89. The leading decisions are reviewed in People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E.
585 (1926).
90. The appropriate scope of the doctrine of "harmless error" has recently been con-
sidered at great length in a series of cases originating in the Second Circuit. See Bollenbach v.
United States, 326 U. S. 607 (1946); Bihn v. United States, 66 Sup. Ct. 1172 (U. S. 1946).
91. See Dession, From Indictment to Infornation-mplications of the Shift (1932) 42
YALE L. J. 163, 176-7.
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ticipation through jury service in the process of administering the
criminal law has a value in the accusatorial as well as in the adjudica-
tion stage. Judicial administration should not merely serve to decide
cases, but also afford a demonstration of democratic justice; and if an
indictment is merely an accusation, the fact remains, despite the legal
presumption of innocence, that it carries considerable weight. For both
of these reasons it was felt that slipshod methods in the impaneling of
grand juries and the toleration of unqualified personnel can work
sufficient harm to justify implementing the standards prescribed.
The appointment of a foreman for each grand jury has been custom-
ary practice 9 2 and is continued by Rule 6(c). Appointment is by the
court, and the foreman's duties are prescribed.9 3 The Rule also makes
a new provision for appointment by the court of a deputy foreman to
act in the absence of the foreman.
Persons authorized to be present in the grand jury room are specifi-
cally enumerated in the next subdivision of Rule 6. No departure from
former practice is involved,9 4 but the provision should eliminate any
uncertainty which might otherwise exist:95
"Attorneys for the government, the witness under examination,
interpreters when needed and, for the purpose of taking the evi-
dence, a stenographer may be present while the grand jury is in
session, but no person other than the jurors may be present while
the grand jury is deliberating or voting."
92. 36 STAT. 1165 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 420 (1940) (Grand juror foreman).
93. Rule 6(e) provides: ". . . The foreman shall have power to administer oaths and
affirmations and shall sign all indictments. He or another juror designated by him shall keep
a record of the number of jurors concurring in the finding of every indictment and shall file
the record with the clerk of the court, but the record shall not be made public except on
order of the court. .. ."
The foreman was charged by the statute cited in note 92 with the duty of administering
oaths, and by 48 STAT. 649 (1934), 18 U. S. C. § 554a (1940), with keeping and filing the
record of grand jurors concurring in an indictment. With respect to the latter see United
States v. Parker, 103 F. (2d) 857, 860 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939), cert. denied, 307 U. S. 642 (1939).
Indorsement of the indictment by the foreman has been customary practice, but his failure
so to do has not been considered fatal. See Frisbie v. United States, 157 U. S. 160, 163-5
(1895).
94. 17 STAT. 198 (1872), 18 U. S. C. § 556 (1940) permitted stenographers and clerks
assisting the United States attorney or other counsel for the government to be present before
the Grand Jury during the taking of testimony. 34 STAT. 816 (1906), 5 U. S. C. § 310 (1940)
dealt with the presence of attorneys for the Government other than the United States attor-
ney. With the last clause of Rule 6(d) cf. United States v. Wells, 163 Fed, 313 (D. Idaho
1908); United States v. Terry, 39 Fed. 355 (N. D. Cal. 1889).
95. See Address by Medalie, NoTEs AND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS (1946) 153:
"When I first heard of Federal criminal procedure, I found that it was the prac-
tice to try to get rid of indictments by proving that someone was in the grand jury
who had no right to be there, and usually it was some deputy marshall or somebody
else, some unauthorized person, and then the great to-do was how to get a person
authorized. One of the ways to get a stenographer authorized in those days was to
have him sworn in as Assistant United States Attorney. .. ."
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The remedy for violation of this provision is a motion to dismiss the
indictmentY
The frequently troublesome problem of the secrecy of grand jury
proceedings is dealt with in Rule 6(e), as follows:
"Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other
than its deliberations and the vote of any juror may be made to the
attorneys for the government for use in the performance of their
duties. Otherwise a juror, attorney, interpreter or stenographer
may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when so
directed by the court preliminarily to or in connection with a judi-
cial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the request of the
defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to
dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the
grand jury. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed upon any
person except in accordance with this rule. The court may direct
that an indictment shall be kept secret until the defendant is in cus-
tody or has given bail, and in that event the clerk shall seal the in-
dictment and no person shall disclose the finding of the indictment
except when necessary for the issuance and execution of a warrant
or summons."
0
With two important exceptions, this provision substantially restates
the former policy and practice with respect to secrecy.07 The first is the
provision for disclosure, which is designed to save time and facilitate
proof where a motion to dismiss an indictment is made in good faith on
the ground of some impropriety in the conduct of a grand jury pro-
ceeding.9 s The second is the provision that no obligation of secrecy
96. Id. at 154.
97. The policy of secrecy is traditional, and violation of the required grand juror's oath
of secrecy is both a contempt and a crime at common law. 4 BL. Couu. *126. Numerous
state statutes likewise require such an oath. See ComENTARmE to the A. L. I. CODE: CRUn.
PRoc. (1931) §§ 126, 143-5. The matter was not dealt with by federal statute, but for forms
of the grand juror's oath see 15 HUGHES, FEDEAL PRAcnrcE, JU1sDICTXo, Mi'D ProCEDnUR
(1932) §§ 16033-4; and Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. 992, 995, No. 18,255 (C. C. Cal.
1872). The general policy is discussed in United States v. Providence Tribune Co., 241 Fed.
524 (D. R. I. 1917). For the common interpretation, prior to the adoption of the present
Rules, of the obligations of grand jurors in respect of secrecy see United States v. Socony
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 233-7 (1940); Schmidt v. United States, 115 F. (2d) 394
(C. C. A. 6th, 1940); United States v. American Medical Association, 26 F. Supp. 429
(D. D. C. 1939); Metzler v. United States, 64 F. (2d) 203 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933); Mcinney v.
United States, 199 Fed. 25 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912); United States v. Farrington, 5 Fed. 343
(N. D. N. Y. 1881); cf. Atwell v. United States, 162 Fed. 97 (C. C. A. 4th, 1908).
98. See Medalie, skpra note 95, at 154:
"In other words, instead of this old business of chasing around trying to get
affidavits and running into grand jurors, even after the indictment has been filed
and everybody apprehended, the grand juror may speak about certain things, you
may get a formal judicial proceeding immediately if you show it is your intention,
in good faith, to make a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground, for ex-
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may be imposed upon any person except in accordance with this rule.
The rather common practice of requiring witnesses before the grand
jury to take an oath of secrecy is therefore no longer authorized,"9 such
restriction being considered impractical and unfair.'
The former requirement of twelve concurring votes for indictment
and the usual formalities in connection with the return of an indictment
are continued by Rule 6(f). It also specifically states that if the de-
fendant has been held to answer and 12 jurors do not concur in finding
an indictment, "the foreman shall so report to the court in writing
forthwith"-the purpose being to insure prompt release of the defend-
ant or exoneration of bail.
The Indictment and the Information. Use of an information in lieu of
indictment, the form and contents of these pleadings, and the bill of
particulars are dealt with in Rule 7 which alters the former practice in
several respects.
An offense punishable by death must still be prosecuted by indict-
ment. For offenses punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year or at hard labor,101 the requirement of indictment is likewise
ample, that there was an unauthorizet person present before the grand jury. That
avoids doing the thing twice.
Compare 48 STAT. 649 (1934), 18 U. S. C. § 554a (1940) which forbids a grand juror to
testify how he or any other juror has voted, in connection with an attack on an indictment
on the ground that one or more unqualified persons were included in the grand jury.
99. At common law no oath of secrecy was administered to witnesses, but apparently
any person present was considered bound to refrain from disclosure. I CnTTY, CRtIxM
LAW (5th Am. ed. 1847) 1317. There has been no federal statutory requirement, but in ap-
proximately 33 of the 85 district courts it has been the practice to swear witnesses to secrecy.
See Goodman v. United States, 108 F. (2d) 516, 518-9 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939); United States
v. Amazon Industrial Chemical Corporation, 55 F. (2d) 254, 260-4 (D. Md. 1931), and
COMMITTEE NoTE to Rule 7, FEDERAL RULES or CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY
DRAFT (1943) 26.
100. NOTES TO TE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR TnE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE
UNITED STATES (1945) 7; and see address by Medalie, NoTEs AND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS
(1946) 155:
"I know that some of the judges in some of the district courts have refused to
administer such an oath, and have set themselves against punishment for contempt
for breach of that oath, if taken. Others, however, have believed in that oath, and
have enforced it by contempt orders .... It was impractical and unreal-a part-
ner, an employee, a relative, a friend called on to testify will come back and tell the
person concerning whom he testified, and it should be so."
101. See NoTEs AND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS (1946) 15, (Note to Subdivision (a)), and
see cases cited supra note 73. In thus defining the offenses which must be prosecuted by
indictment the Rule follows the judicial interpretation of "infamous crime." The meaning of
"hard labor" in this context was litigated in a recent anti-trust prosecution commenced by
information, wherein it was decided that the term has to be understood in its historic con-
text and not confused with the varieties of manual labor to which misdemeanants may today
be put in the work camps and on the farms which are a part of the federal prison system. See
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F. (2d) 93, 117 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944), aff'd,
66 Sup. Ct. 1125 (U. S. 1946); (1945) 54 YALE L. J. 707.
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continued, but in such cases defendants may now waive the require-
ment. Misdemeanors may always be prosecuted on information, as
formerly.
When an information is to be filed, it is no longer necessary that leave
of court first be obtained. After Albrecht v. United States 112 indicated
that it was within the court's discretion to require or forego a showing
of probable cause as a condition to granting leave, such showings were
rarely required and obtaining leave tended to become largely proforma.
Federal prosecutions are instituted either in the name of the Attorney
General or of a United States Attorney, and in either instance internal
office regulations normally insure a rather thorough review of the
merits of proceedings instituted. In some of the more complicated
federal cases--such as those under the antitrust laws, which typically
turn on inferences from great accumulations of circumstantial data-
it is difficult to imagine the form which a preliminary showing of prob-
able cause might take, unless it were to approximate a lengthy grand
jury presentation. The new Rule places responsibility on the person
in the best position to discharge it, the prosecuting attorney who is
familiar with all the evidence in the case.
The provision in Rule 7(b) providing for waiver of indictment has
long been recommended. 10 3 Under the former practice-and still in
not a few of the states-a person unable to furnish bail may be held in
jail for weeks and even months awaiting grand jury action, even
though he is willing to plead guilty, and this time is not as a matter of
law deductible from his sentence. The new rule, designed to eliminate
such unnecessary incarceration, should result incidentally in a con-
siderable saving of unproductive maintenance expense to the Govern-
ment.3
0 4
The nature and contents of an indictment or information are pre-
scribed in Rule 7(c). 05 Simple and non-technical pleadings are con-
102. 273 U. S. 1 (1927).
103. See REP. OF TE JUDIcIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRcUT JUDGES (1941) 9;
Rep. Att'y Gen. (Mitchell) (1931) 2; id. (1932) 6; id. (Cummings) (1933) 1; id. (1936) 2;
id. (1937) 11; id. (1938) 9; id. (Murphy) (1939) 7.
Rule 7(b) provides that "An offense which may be punished by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year or at hard labor may be prosecuted by information if the defendant,
after he has been advised of the nature of the charge and of his rights, vaives in open court
prosecution by indictment."
104. That the constitutional guaranty of indictment by grand jury is waivable had
previously been held in United States v. Gill, S5 F. (2d) 399, 403 (D. N. M. 1931).
105.
"(c) NATURE AND CONTENTS. The indictment or the information shall be a
plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the
offense charged. It shall be signed by the attorney for the government. It need not
contain a formal commencement, a formal conclusion or any other matter not nec-
essary to such statement. Allegations made in one count may be incorporated by
reference in another count. It may be alleged in a single count that the means by
1947]
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templated, as illustrated in the Appendix of Forms prepared by the
Advisory Cbmmittee."'5 But since such pleadings were entirely suffi-
cient before the adoption of the Rule, it may be assumed that prolixity
up to a point will continue to be tolerated and that the Rule will not
end the flow of republication by commercial annotators of trial court
rulings on procedural points which have little, significance beyond the
particular case and serve chiefly to augment the work of law clerks and
the costs of litigation. The draftsmen of a code can do little about that.
The Rule does not institute the "short form" type, of pleading sanc-
tioned in some of the states, which presupposes the furnishing of a bill
of particulars to round out the minimum of information to which a de-
fendant is entitled before being called upon to plead." 7 The pleading
here contemplated would be complete in itself.
The requirement of citation in an indictment or information of the
statute or regulation on which the prosecution is based follows a prac-
tice adopted by some district court judges in the past. It serves two
purposes: to assist a defendant to find the provision of law which he is
supposed to have violated; and, where the facts alleged by the Govern-
ment suggest distinct violations of several different statutes or regula-
tions, to tell him under which ones the Government seeks conviction. 0
There is a provision in subdivision (d) for striking surplusage from
an indictment or information. This is nothing new, so far as informa-
tions are concerned, and recognizes that indictments also (like informa-
tions, indictments are drafted by the prosecuting attorneys rather than
by the grand jurors) may contain argumentative characterizations of
defendants, innuendo designed to prejudice the court and jury, or
slippery definitions of overt acts such as: "Pursuant to and in further-
ance of the aforementioned conspiracy the defendants did the following
acts, among others: . . ." 109 Indictments may not, however, be amended
which the defendant committed the offense are unknown or that he committed it
by one or more specified means. The indictment or information shall state for each
count the official or customary citation of the statute, rule, regulation or other pro.
vision of law which the defendant is alleged therein to have violated. Error in the
citation or its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or infor-
mation or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the
defendant to his prejudice."
106. Rule 61 provides that "the forms contained in the Appendix of Forms are illustra.
tive and not mandatory."
107. See, e.g., the New York provision discussed in People v. Bogdanoff, 254 N. Y. 16,
171 N. E. 890 (1930).
108. Although district judges have occasionally required the Government to specify,
before trial, the statutes or regulations relied upon, such citations were not considered a
necessary part of the indictment or information. A conviction might be sustained on the
basis of a Statute or regulation other than that cited. See Williams v. United States, 168
U. S. 382, 389 (1897); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 229 (1941).
109. See Address by Medalie, NOTES AND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS (1946) 157-8:
"It used to be that once an indictment was found the grand jury being the sole
(Vol. 560197
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-which is to say that new allegations or a new theory of the case may
not be introduced by the court.
The remaining subdivisions of Rule 7-(e) and (f) 110 -continue the
former practice with respect to amendment of an information 1' and
the furnishing of a bill of particulars. 12 A motion for a bill must be
made "within ten days after arraignment" unless the court otherwise
provides.
Joinder of Offenses and of Defendants. Rule 8, covering joinder, is
designed to clarify an ambiguity in the statute which formerly gov-
erned "13 and to resolve a conflict which had arisen in practice. Other-
wise, it substantially restates the law. The Rule reads:
"(a) Joinder of Offenses. Two or more offenses may be charged
in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each
offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or
both, are of the same or similar character or are based on the same
act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected
together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.
"(b) Joinder of Defendants. Two or more defendants may be
charged in the same indictment or information if they are alleged
to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same
series of 'acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses.
Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or
separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each
count."
Subdivision (a) involves no real change." 4 The provision in subdi-
author of an indictment, it and it only could make any alterations by a superseding
indictment; but not even the judge had the power to put a pen to the indictment.
If he did, you changed the indictment. It was no longer the indictment of the grand
jury. The prosecution ended, as a matter of constitutional law. That was settled.
There was a little chiseling on that, I understand, in one circuit.
"Honorable Learned Hand: 'We didn't let that bother us too much'."
110. (e) Amendment of Information. The court may permit an information to be
amended at any time before verdict or finding if no additional or different offense is charged
and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.
(f) Bill of Particulars. The court for cause may direct the filing of a bill of particulars.
A motion for a bill of particulars may be rnde only within ten days after arraignment or at
such other time before or after arraignment as may be prescribed by rule or order. A bill of
particulars may be amended at any time subject to such conditions as justice requires.
111. See Muncy v. United States, 289 Fed. 780 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923).
112. See NOTES T THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT CouRrs O-
THE UNiTED STATES (1945) 10, Note to Subdivision (f).
113. 10 STAT. 162 (1853), 18 U. S. C. § 557 (1940).
114. 9 EDmuNDs, CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROcEDUnn (2d ed. 1943) 4116; Welsh v.
United States, 267 Fed. 819 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920), cert. denied, 254 U. S. 637 (1920) (distinct
offenses in separate counts, based on the "same act or transaction"); Beard v. United States,
82 F. (2d) 837 (App. D. C., 1936), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 655 (1936) (distinct offenses in
separate counts based on "two or more acts or transactions connected together"); Pointer v.
United States, 151 U. S. 396, 403 (distinct offenses in separate counts of the "same class");
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vision (b) that defendants may be joined in an indictment even though
all are not charged in each count goes beyond the former practice in
some circuits, in favor of that followed in the Seventh and perhaps a
few others.'" Beyond this, subdivision (b) continues the practice
which was usually followed despite lack of any federal statute providing
generally for the joinder of defendants, as distinguished from offenses.
Warrant or Summons upon Indictment or Information. The issuance
and execution or service of a warrant of arrest or summons at this stage
of a proceeding are governed by Rule 9. Its provisions are substantially
similar to those of Rule 4 governing the earlier issuance of such process
upon the complaint."' Two new features are, however, introduced at
this stage.
An indictment affords a sufficient basis for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest, as formerly. But where the proceeding is by information, the
Fourth Amendment has been thought to require, as a basis for the issu-
ance of a warrant, something more than the signature of the govern-
ment attorney on the information."' The Rule therefore provides that
to support the issuance of a warrant, an information must be "supported
by oath." Whether this oath must be on personal knowledge rather
than on information and belief is not stated. In the latter alternative,
there is the further question whether the sources of information and
grounds for belief must be spelled out in the affidavit, or whether a
general verification as for a bill in equity will suffice.
Several considerations suggest that a general verification may suffice.
Before an information is filed, the case will have been studied by one or
more attorneys for the government. Unlike the complaint, which under
Simpkins v. United States, 78 F. (2d) 594 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935) (distinct offenses in separate
counts of the same "character").
The language "constituting parts of a common scheme or plan" is added by the Rule,
having been suggested by a comparable provision in the law of New York and by several
federal decisions. See New York Laws 1936, c. 328 § 1, N. Y. CODE CItM. PROC. § 279
(1936), discussed in Recent Statutes (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 1027, and (1937) 14 N. Y. U. L. Q.
REv. 250; People v. Luciano, 277 N. Y. 348, 362, 12 N. E. (2d) 433, 437 (1938); Stern v.
United States, 85 F. (2d) 394 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936), cert. denied, Schweitzer v. United States,
299 U. S. 576 (1936); Powers v. United States, 293 Fed. 964, 967 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923).
For a collection of federal precedents and'a discussion of the common law practice, see
COmbITrEE NOTE to Rule 8, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, SECOND PREILIm-
NARY DRAFT (1944) 29-34.
115. See Caringella v. United States, 78 F. (2d) 563, 567 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935), and Costx-
MITTEE NOTE to Rule 8, id. at 35-7.
116. See Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: I (1946) 55 YALE L. J.
694, 705-6.
As therein stated, a summons is the accepted method for bringing a corporate defendant
before the court. For an interesting discussion of what would happen if no one responded to
the summons on behalf of the corporation, see NoTEs AND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS (1946),
134-43.
117. See Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1, 5 (1927).
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Rule 4 may be verified by anyone, the information must be signed by
a government attorney. It may normally be assumed that the informa-
tion would not have been filed in the absence of evidence at least suffi-
cient to induce a grand jury to return an indictment. In the more com-
plicated federal cases preparation of an affidavit going beyond a general
verification would be an onerous task at best, and in some cases utterly
impracticable. And, unlike Rule 4, Rule 9 does not speak in terms of
"probable cause." The Fourth Amendment does, to be sure. But the
showing appropriate to protect the interests of one to be arrested at the
information stage of a proceeding need not necessarily be the same as at
the complaint stage. The Fourth Amendment contains no rigid defini-
tion of "probable cause."
The second noteworthy feature of this Rule is the provision that
"The amount of bail may be fixed by the court and endorsed on the
warrant." Such procedure eliminates unnecessary delays between the
arrest and the giving of bail and has in fact been the practice in some
districts.118
ARRAIGNMENT AND PREPARATION FOR TRIAL
Arraignment. Rule 10 provides:
"Arraignment shall be conducted in open court and shall consist
of reading the indictment or information to the defendant or stating
to him the substance of the charge and calling on him to plead
thereto. He shall be given a copy of the indictment or information
before he is called upon to plead."
The last sentence is new, and supersedes that part of 18 U. S. C. § 562
which required that a copy be furnished the defendant several days
before trial in treason and other capital cases, and 18 U. S. C. § 562a
which required that in other cases a copy be furnished the defendant
upon request, on condition that fees for the copy and the clerk's certi-
ficate might be taxed as costs." 9 The Advisory Committee had recom-
mended that defendants be furnished copies upon request, after being
advised of their right to receive them; 12- but the Rule as adopted by
the Court makes it mandatory.'
2 ,
118. NOTES To THE RULES OF CRIBUNAL PROCEDURE FOR THE DmTmcRT COURTs oF THE
UNITED STATES (1945) 11.
119. Similar provision was made in England by the Indictments Act, 1915, Rule 13 (1).
Compare A. L. I. CODE CRLm. PRoc. (1930) § 201; N. Y. CODE Canx. PRoc. (1936) § 309.
120. FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE ADvisoRY ComnirErEr
(1944) Rule 10.
121. There has been some discussion of the effect upon subsequent proceedings in the
case of an omission to comply with this feature of the Rule. See address by Holtzoff, NoTES
AND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS (1946) 125:
"In order to preclude the possibility of any question being raised subsequent
to conviction because of alleged failure to comply with the new requirement, it may
19471
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:197
It is refreshing to know that the picayune expense of making an extra
carbon copy need no longer deter us from giving defendants the infor-
mation they need. 12 Perhaps, if the desired simplicity of pleading
sought by the Rules materializes, defendants may even be in a position
to understand the charges brought against them.
In other respects the Rule restates the familiar federal practice,
which was not prescribed by statute, but based on common law proce-
dure as evolved in the federal courts and in England.
23
Pleas. Rule 11 124 restates the former practice and retains, among
other things, the plea of nolo contendere. While today "unknown in
English procedure," 125 that plea has long been established in federal
practice as well as in that of many states. 25 Originally devised as a
preliminary to reaching an "arrangement" with the court, and more
recently utilized to settle criminal proceedings without prejudice to the
pleader in other actions pending or prospective, the plea is now most
familiar in situations such as the negotiation of an anti-trust consent
seem advisable to formulate a detailed local rule, prescribing the manner in which a
copy of the indictment or information shall be delivered to the defendant, and the
manner in which record of such delivery shall be preserved. . . . It may be well to
prescribe that certificates of service shall be made and filed with the clerk as a part
of the record of the case. It may be cogently argued that failure to comply with this
requirement is a mere irregularity, not affecting the result, but it is best to take no
chances."
122. Compare United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U. S. 169, 173 (1891):"... there is no
propriety in forcing a copy upon him and charging the government with the epense."
123. See Garland v. Washington, 232 U. S. 642 (1914); Johnson v. United States, 225
U. S. 405 (1912). The Garland decision held that failure to comply with arraignment require-
ments was a mere irregularity not warranting reversal, if not raised before trial.
124. "A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or with the consent of the court, nolo
contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept the plea
without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature
of the charge. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty
or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty."
For the former practice see 4 STAT. 777 (1835), 18 U. S. C. § 564 (1940) (standing mute);
Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U. S. 314, 318 (1892); United States v. Beadon, 49 F. (2d) 164, 167
(C. C. A. 2d, 1931), cert. denied 284 U. S. 625 (1931) (plea of not guilty to be entered for a
corporation which fails to appear).
125. See FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, SECOND PRELIMINARY DRAFT
(1944), Note to Rule 11, citing letter from Sir John Simon, former Attorney General of tng-
land, to Department of Justice, Aug. 20, 1926. But the plea was known at common law.
See Hudson v. United States, 272 U. S. 451, 453 (1926): "But no example of its use in the
English courts has been found since the case of Queen v. Templeman, decided in 1702, . . ."
126. The A. L. I. CODE CRIM. PROC. (1930) does not provide for this plea, See C. 9.
However, it receives legislative recognition in 43 STAT. 1259 (1925), 18 U. S. C. § 724 (1940),
and is accepted in Hudson v. United States, 272 U. S. 451 (1926). See also 5 Lo GSDOnR,
CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1929) §§ 2095-101, 2459; 9 HUGHEs, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE, JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (1931) § 7089; and DoBmE, HANDI1OOE or FEDERAL
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (1928) 79-80.
NEW RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE II
decree.'- As Arthur T. Vanderbilt has observed, there is a "rapidly
increasing membership in the nwlo contendere club and the non velt
fraternity even in otherwise respectable grades of society." 12
Pleadings and Motions before Trial; Defenses and Objections. This
particular phase of the procedure "gave the committee more trouble
than any other rule in the book," and resulted in "a very drastic rule"
which "should aid very materially in clearing away the underbrush in
criminal prosecutions." 12 Until this Rule was adopted, federal prac-
tice required 1'0 that defendants raise defenses and objections as in the
days of Blackstone:
"The plea of the prisoner . . . is either, 1. A plea to the juris-
diction; 2. A demurrer; 3. A plea in abatement; 4. A special plea
in bar; or, 5. The general issue . . . or plea of not guilty. .. ." 131
There is no objection to tradition as such but, unfortunately, in any
given federal circuit or state the reported decisions often leave the
tradition unclear as it concerns particular defenses or objections.132 In
that situation a defense attorney can either engage in exhaustive--and
frequently inconclusive-research to determine how to entitle his de-
fense or objection, or he can file his pleadings in quadruplicate, with
each set differently entitled.133 Rule 12 13- is designed to put an end to
127. See Lenvin and Meyers, Nolo Contendere: Its Nature and ImpF"calions (1942) 51
YALE L. J. 1255; and Foreword (1940) 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 1.
128. NOTES AND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS (1946) 112.
129. See Youngquist, id., at 162-3.
130. Many states still have this requirement. For proposals that state practice be simi-
larly changed see REPORT OF =EE ComIssION ON T"E ADmINsTRnaTiON, oF JUSTICE R., NEW
YoRx STATE (1939) §§ 282, 283; and A. L. 1. CoDE CEm. Pnoc. (1930) § 209. DEL. REv.
CODE (1935) § 5318 (c. 155, § 23) abolishes demurrers, pleas in abatement and pleas to the
jurisdiction, and provides that objections theretofore raised by them shall be made by mo-
tion to quash.
131. BL. Comm. ** 326, 332.
132. See Cummings, THE TmR GREAT ADVENTURE (1943) 29 A. B. A. J. 654, 655;
Medalie, Federal Rules of Criminal Proceedings (1944) 4 LA VERS GUILD REv. (3) 1, 4; and
the tabulation of ways in which the raising of various defenses and objections has been per-
mitted in the various circuits, in FEDERAL RULES OF CRPIIAL PROCEDURE, SECOND PRE-
LIMNARY DmAFT (1944) 51-60.
133. See, e.g., the defense pleas and motions filed in State v. Hayes, 127 Conn. 43,
18 A. (2d) 895 (1941), RECORD ON APPEAL, Vol. I.
134.
"(a) PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS. Pleadings in criminal proceedings shall be the in-
dictment and the information, and the pleas of not guilty, guilty and nobo contend-
ere. All other pleas, and demurrers and motions to quash are abolished, and de-
fenses and objections raised before trial which heretofore could have been raked by
one or more of them shall be raised only by motion to dismiss or to grant appro-
priate relief, as provided in these rules.
(b) TEm MOTIoN RAISING DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS.
(1) Defenses and Objections Mich May Be Raised. Any defense or objection
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this nonsense. Pleas in abatement, pleas in bar, demurrers and mo-
tions to quash are abolished. 135 Now one simply entitles his piece of
paper a "motion," states what he has to state by way of defense or ob-
jection, and asks for what he wants. The Rule changes nothing with
respect to what he may or may not get.
Certain defenses and objections must be raised before trial, while
others may be raised at any time. In this respect there is no change
from the former practice."' Those falling in the first group-defects in
the institution of the prosecution or in the indictment or information
(other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an
offense)-must now be made in a single motion 137 including all such
defenses and objections then available to the defendant, and the mo-
tion is to be made before plea unless the court permits it to be made
within a reasonable time thereafter. In the latter event it is no longer
necessary to withdraw the plea in order to make the motion.
The hearing and determination of motions are governed by subdi-
vision (b)(4). Normally they are to be heard and determined before
which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be
raised before trial by motion.
(2) Defenses and Objections Which Must Be Raised. Defenses and objections
based on defects in the institution of the prosecution or in the indictment or infor-
mation other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an of-
fense may be raised only by motion before trial. The motion shall include all such
defenses and objections then available to the defendant. Failure to present any
such defense or objection as herein provided constitutes a waiver thereof, but the
court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver. Lack of jurisdiction or the
failure of the indictment or information to charge an offense shall be noticed by the
court at any time during the pendency of the proceeding.
(3) Time of Making Motion. The motion shall be made before the plea is
entered, but the court may permit it to be made within a reasonable time there-
after.
(4) Hearing on Motion. A motion before trial raising defenses or objections
shall be determined before trial unless the court orders that it be deferred for de-
termination at the trial of the general issue. An issue of fact shall be tried by a jury
if a jury trial is required under the Constitution or an act of Congress. All other
issues of fact shall be determined by the court with or without a jury or on affida-
vits or in such other manner as the court may direct.
(5) Effect of Determination. If a motion is determined adversely to the defend-
ant he shall be permitted to plead if he had not previously pleaded, A plea previ-
ously entered shall stand. If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the
institution of the prosecution or in the indictment or information, it may also order
that the defendant be held in custody or that his bail be continued for a specified
time pending the filing of a new indictment or information. Nothing in this rule
shall be deemed to affect the provisions of any act of Congress relating to periods of
limitations."
135. Rule 7(a) of the F. R. Civ. P. introduced a similar change.
136. The former decisions are reviewed in FEDERAL RuLEs OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
SECOND PRELMINARY DRAFT (1944), Committee Note to Rule 12, at 60-6.
137. Compare Rule 12(g), F. R. Civ. P.
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trial, but if issues of fact which cannot conveniently then be tried are
"involved, the court may reserve the motion for trial with the general
issue. The right to jury trial of an issue raised by motion is unaffected
by the Rule, which merely incorporates the former law in this regard
without specifically enumerating the issues so triable l as All others may
be determined by the court "with or without a jury or on affidavits or
in such other manner as the court may direct." I"
The effects of an adverse determination of a defendant's motion are
unchanged by the Rule."I He may still plead if he has not already done
so. Where the determination is in the defendant's favor, the court may
order him held in custody or continue his bail for a specified time pend-
ing the filing of a new indictment or information. Statutory proisions
permitting re-indictment in this situation, even though the statute of
limitations has run in the meantime, are expressly preserved.14'
Trial Together of Indictments or Informations. The former practice 142
is substantially restated *by Rule 13, which provides:
"The court may order two or more indictments or informations or
both to be tried together if the offenses, and the defendants if there
is more than one, could have been joined in a single indictment or
information. The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution
were under such single indictment or information."
The words "tried together" are used in the Rule, although the statute
formerly governing spoke of "consolidated" indictments, in order to
avoid any possible confusion arising out of the various connotations of
the latter term in civil practice. 43 The result of the last sentence of
the Rule is that provisions governing peremptory challenges, the ad-
mission of evidence, verdicts and sentences which apply in the trial of a
138. See address by Youngquist, NoTEs ,AND INSTITUTE PROCERDINGS (1946) 164:
"but there was danger in trying to point out which of these objections were
triable by jury and which were not. It is a very indefinite field, and it would hardly
do to mislead the courts and to mislead counsel by saying that such and such an
objection may be tried by the court without the jury, and then to have the Supreme
Court later say that under the Constitution there was a right of trial by jury.... "
139. The methods which have been employed in determining defenses and objections
raised by pleas in abatement and pleas in bar are reviewed in FWERu., RuLEs OF CnRmE=A
PROCEDURE, SECOND PRELIM=NARY DRaFT (1944), Committee Note to Rule 12, at 66-8.
Methods of trial of the issue of the present sanity of a defendant when raised before trial are
discussed in Dession, The Mentally Ill Offender in Federal Critminal Law Admiristration
(1944) 53 YALE L. J. 684.
140. See 17 STAT. 158 (1862), 18 U. S. C. § 561 (1940).
141. See 54 STAT. 747 (1940), 18 U. S. C. §§ 556a, 587-9 (1940).
142. See 10 STAT. 162 (1853), 18 U. S. C. § 557 (1940); and cases collected in FEDERAL
RULES OF CamnmAL PROCEDURE, SECOND PRELimiNARY DRAFT (1944), Committee Note to
Rule 14, at 73-3.
143. Id.at77.
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single indictment or information apply likewise where indictments or
informations are tried together.
Relief from Prejudicial Joinder. The former practice under which
severance and other similar relief was a matter for the discretion of the
court is continued by Rule 14.144
Pre-Trial Procedure. No provision for pre-trial conferences such as
that made in Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is included in these
Rules, as finally approved. The Advisory Committee recommended
such a provision, 145 since the practice of utilizing pre-trial conference
procedure on the criminal as well as the civil side had already begun to
develop as a routine in some districts, 14 and since such conferences are
in any event inevitable in lengthy and complex cases. Rule or no rule,
there is of course no law precluding a request from the court that the
parties appear to discuss the possibility of narrowing issues, eliminating
uncontested issues of fact, and stipulating other practical arrangements
to facilitate getting on with a proceeding. 47
The rule recommended by the Advisory Committee sought to avoid
any element of compulsion of the defendant, having in mind the obvious
differences between criminal and civil proceedings in respect of the
relationship of the defendant to the court as well as to the adverse
144. "If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of
offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together,
the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants
or provide whatever other relief justice requires."
For the former practice see 10 STAT. 162 (1853), 18 U. S. C. § 557 (1940); Stilson v.
United States, 250 U. S. 583 (1919); United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662 (1896); FEDERAL
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, SECOND PRELIMINARY DRAFT (1944), Committee Note to
Rule 13, at 69-73; A. L. I. CODE CIM~. PROC. (1930) § 312; Notes (1941) 131 A. L. R. 917,
(1936) 104 A. L. R. 1519 (1931) 70 A. L. R. 1171.
145. See FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF TIlE ADvISORY Cobl-
miTTEE (1944) Rule 15:
"Pre-Trial Procqdure. At any time after the filing of the indictment or infor-
mation the court may invite the attorneys to appear before it for a cdnference, at
which the defendant shall have the right to be present, to consider
(1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which
will avoid unnecessary proof;
(3) The number of expert witnesses or character witnesses or other witnesses
who are to give testimony of a cumulative nature;
(4) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the proceeding.
The court shall make an order which recites the agreements made by the par-
ties as to any of the matters considered. All orders entered at the pre-trial confer-
ence control the subsequent course of the proceeding, unless modified at the trial to
prevent manifest injustice. This rule shall not be invoked in case of any defendant
who is not represented by counsel."
146. See Way, New Technique Facilitates Criminal Trials (1941) 25 J. AM. JIJD. Soc. 120;
Comment (1942) 26 J. Ami. JuD. Soc. 106; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF TIlE AD-
MINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1941) 77.
147. See 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 816.
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party. Participation in the conference was to be upon "initation"
rather than by "direction"; the defendant was to have the right to be
present in person; and the rule was not to be invoked in the case of any
defendant not represented by counsel. But the proposal nevertheless
encountered resistance. Some prosecuting attorneys took the position
that it would encourage "fishing expeditions" by defendants, and some
defense-minded critics feared that it might result in forcing concessions
and stipulations to which a defendant would not otherwise agree. In
any event, the Court rejected the proposal.
Notice of Alibi. There was considerable discussion in the Advisory
Committee, and considerable difference of opinion, as to whether the
Rules should include a requirement similar 'to that adopted in some of
the states, that a defendant proposing to rely upon an alibi defense
give notice thereof in advance. 13 The proposal was familiar. It had
been promoted in practically all bar association committees concerned
with criminal law reform between 1935 and 1938, and had been ad-
vanced by the Wickersham Commission in 1931 and the Attorney
General's Conference on Crime as well as the American Bar AssociA-
tion in 1934.149
It is true-and this is a peculiarity of criminal procedure-that rela-
tively little affirmative pleading (or pre-trial disclosure) is required of a
defendant. The plea of "not guilty" is quite noncommittal. But it
should be equally apparent from Rule 7 (the Indictment and the Infor-
mation)-read in the light of the tolerance generally accorded vari-
ances in the proof of government cases, Rule 15 (Depositions) and Rule
16 (Discovery and Inspection) 130-that the Government is likewise by
no means completely deprived of the strategy of surprise.
So long as the procedure does not require disclosure by both parties
in advance of trial of the names and addresses of their witnesses, and of
the evidence upon which they propose to rely, surprise will continue to
play a part in crimin~al proceedings. Unanticipated evidence of an alibi
is no more surprising than any other variety of unanticipated evidence
and, for that matter, alibi defenses are actually not very frequent in
federal prosecutions. The possibility of a major shift in procedural at-
titudes to reduce the role of surprise and other irrational factors is well
148. Some fourteen states so require. See FEDERAL RuLEs or CRj.IINAL ProcEDurE,
SECOND PRELunNARY DRFr (1944), Committee Note to Rule 16, at S1, S4-9, and statutes
therein mentioned. So does Scotland. See RNToN and BROWN, CRun.L. PnocuDurn Ac-
CORDING To =n LAW OF SCOTLAND (2d ed., 1928). See also Millar, The focdern zli.on of
Criminal Procedure (1920) 11 J. Am. INST. CRut. L.AND CRP.InOLOGY 345; KEN.NY, OuTu .h.
OF CmIN.AL LAW (15th ed. 1936) 534, 539.
149. NATIONAL COMIIIssION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORcFcIE\.'r, REFOnT ON
CRnnNAL PROCEDURE (1931) 47; PROCEEDINGS OF TEE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CONFERECE
ON CI sn (1934) 453; A. B. A. REP. (1934) 129-30. See also REP. Arr'Y GEN. (Cummings)
(1933) 1; id. (1936) 2; id. (1937) 11; id. (Murphy) (1938) 9; id. (1939) 7.
150. Discussed infra pp. 218-20.
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worth considering, but to single out the unadvertised alibi defense as a
special or major hazard to the administration of justice is to take one's
jurisprudence from Hollywood and the pulps.
The net result of the Advisory Committee's deliberations was a draft
rule requiring that defendants give advance notice of alibi defenses."'1
As finally recommended, this rule would have required that the defend-
ant take the initiative in starting the notice procedure. To some mem-
bers of the Committee this feature, though shared by similar statutes
enacted in eleven states, appeared impractical.152 The Court eliminated
the proposed rule in its entirety.
Depositions. Rule 15 ' covers the taking of depositions and their
151. See FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF TuE ADVISORY CO.M-
MITTEE (1944), Rule 16.
152. See Letter Stating the Views of a Minority of the Committee Concerning Rule 16,
Supplement, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, SECOND PRELIMINARY DRAFT
(1944), 239-41; cf. Reply Memorandum, Prepared by the Secretary of the Committee,
Stating the Views of the Majority of the Committee Concerning Rule 16. Id. at 242-3.
153. The Rule provides:
(a) When Taken. If it appears that a prospective witness may be unable to at-
tend or prevented from attending a trial or hearing, that his testimony is material
and that it is necessary to take his deposition in order to prevent a failure of justice,
the court at any time after the filing of an indictment or information may upon mo-
tion of a defendant and notice to the parties order that his testimony be taken by
deposition and that any designated books, papers, documents or tangible objects,
not privileged, be produced at the same time and place. If a witness is committed
for failure to give bail to appear to testify at a trial or hearing, the court on written
motion of the witness and upon notice to the parties may direct that his deposition
be taken. After the deposition has been subscribed the court may discharge the
witness.
(b) Notice of Taking. The party at whose instance a deposition is to be taken
shall give to every other party reasonable written notice of the time and place for
taking the deposition. The notice shall state the name and address of each person to
be examined. On motion of a party upon whom the notice is served, the court for
cause shown may extend or shorten the time.
(c) Defendant's Counsel and Payment of Expenses. If a defendant is without
counsel the court shall advise him of his right and assign counsel to represent him
unless the defendant elects to proceed without counsel or is able to obtain counsel.
If it appears that a defendant at whose instance a deposition is to be taken cannot
bear the expense thereof, the court may airect that the expenses of travel and sub-
sistence of the defendant's attorney for attendance at the examination shall be paid
by the government. In that event the marshal shall make payment accordingly.
(d) How Taken. A deposition shall be taken in the manner provided in civil
actions. The court at the request of a defendant may direct that a deposition be
taken on written interrogatories in the manner provided in civil actions.
(e) Use. At the trial or upon any hearing, a part or all of a deposition, so far as
otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used if It appears: That
the witness is dead; or that the witness is out of the United States, unless it appears
that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition;
or that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of sickness or infirmity; or
that tie party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of
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permissible use. Unlike the Civil Rules, which authorize examination
of witnesses before trial as a normal routine, this Rule sanctions exami-
nation only of witnesses who "may be unable to attend or prevented
from attending a trial or hearing," or who have been committed for
failure to give bail. Also in contrast with civil procedure,'5 4 depositions
may be taken only in the court's discretion. The assumption here is
that they will be needed only in exceptional situations, since the ordi-
nary witness subpoena in a federal criminal proceeding runs throughout
the United States and not just within the district of issue or 100 miles
from the place of trial as in a civil action." '
As adopted by the Court, the Rule limits to the defense the right to
take depositions.
The Advisory Committee had recommended that the government
also be authorized to do so ;1"' this would have been an innovation in
federal practice. 5 7 The use of depositions by the government would
have been subject to the defendant's constitutional "right of confronta-
tion," to the usual limitations on the use of depositions written into the
Rule, and to the further provision in subdivision (e) that depositions
must be "otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence."
The recommendation was inspired by no desire to dispense with live
witnesses who could be observed and cross-examined at the trial. The
thought was simply that when it appeared in the preliminary stages of a
proceeding that a material witness might later be unavailable, his depo-
sition would in certain circumstances be useful. Just what uses the
Constitution and the judiciary would permit--given a deposition
the witness by subpoena. Any deposition may also be used by any party for the
purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of the deponent as a vitne-s.
If only a part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, an adverse party may
require him to offer all of it which is relevant to the part offered and any party may
offer other parts.
(f) Objections to Admissibility. Objections to receiving in evidence a deposi-
tion or part thereof may be made as provided in civil actions.
154. See Rules 26(a) and 30, F. R. Civ. P.
155. Rule 17(e)(1), F. R. Cans. P. (1946). Compare Rule 45(e)(1), F. R. CIV. P.
156. As recommended by the Advisory Committee, the Rule would have authorized the
taking of depositions on behalf of the government under the following circumstances: (1) If
it appears that a witness may be unavailable for trial or hearing, that his testimony is mate-
rial and that his deposition may be needed to prevent a failure of justice; (2) If a defendant
is without counsel the court shall advise him of his right and appoint counsel to represent
him at the taking of the deposition unless he otherwise elects or is able to obtain couns2l;
(3) The defendant shall be produced at government expense and be present at the taking of
the deposition if in custody, and advised of his right to be present, with expenses prepaid by
the government, if not in custody. See FEDERAL RuLms op CRImw,%! PRocEDURn, REFronT
OF THE ADvIsORY COMrrEE (1944) Rule 17.
157. For a collection of state legislation permitting the taking of depositions by the prose-
cution under various circumstances see FEDERAL RuLE-s op CRnUNAL PRocsEuRE, SEco!,D
PRELIMINARY DRAFT (1944) Note to Rule 17, at 92.
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taken in the defendant's presence, as provided by the recommended
rule-is a question which would have to be explored de novo. But
it is not clear that the "right of confrontation" would preclude all use
of depositions by the government, either at the trial or in preliminary
and supplementary proceedings. After some early doubts, the familiar
exceptions to the hearsay rule have become as accepted in criminal
as in civil trials.' The Court's action in eliminating depositions on
behalf of the government may have been prompted by a feeling that the
government could better afford to lose a few cases than make even a
gesture which might be interpreted as favoring trial on a paper record. 19
The authorization for taking depositions on behalf of the defense is
not new, "I but the Rule does contain several novel features. One is
the provision in subdivision (c) for defendants who "cannot bear the
expense"-not merely for "indigent" defendants, as the Committee
Note suggests.' 6 The court is to assign counsel to represent a defendant
in the taking of a deposition, if he so desires and is unable to obtain
counsel; and the court may direct that the expenses of travel and sub-
sistence of his attorney be paid by the government. The procedure for
taking depositions and their permissible use, save for the exceptions
noted, follow the practice familiar in civil proceedings.
The authorization in subdivision (a) for taking the deposition of a
witness who has been committed pursuant to Rule 46 (b) for failure to
give bail to appear to testify at a trial or hearing, is another new feature
in the Rule. The purpose is to afford a method of relief for such a wit-
ness, if he so desires and the court approves in the particular case. De-
positions so taken could be used for the same purposes and subject to the
same limitations as other depositions, as prescribed by subdivision (e).
Discovery and Inspection. Rule 16 "62 is intended further to reduce
158. See, for example, People v. Reese, 258 N. Y. 89, 179 N. E. 307 (1932).
159. Compare SEN. Doc. No. 1382, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1935 (An act to provide for
taking of depositions in criminal proceedings) which passed the Senate on June 25, 1935 and
was referred to the House on June 27. A companion House measure, H. R. 4531, was tabled
by the House Judiciary Committee on March 5, 1935.
160. See 17 STAT. 89 (1872), 28 U. S. C. § 644 (1940), considered applicable to criminal
proceedings in Wong Yim v. United States, 118 F. (2d) 667 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941), cerl. denied,
313 U. S. 589 (1941); Clymer v. United States, 38 F. (2d) 581 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930); United
States v. Hofmann, 24 F. Supp. 847 (S. D. N. Y. 1938); United States v. Cameron, 15 Fed.
794 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1883). Cf. Luxenberg v. United States, 45 F. (2d) 497 (C. C. A. 4th,
1930), cert. denied, 283 U. S. 820 (1931).
161. NOTES TO THE RULES OF CRimiNAL PROCEDURE FOR THE DIsTRICT COURTS OF THE
UNITED STATES (1945), Rule 15, at 15.
162.
"Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment or infor-
mation, the court may order the attorney for the government to permit the defend-
ant to inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents or tan-.
gible objects, obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained from others
by seizure or by process, upon a showing that the items sought may be material to
[Vol. 56: 197
NEW RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE II
the role of surprise in criminal proceedings. The climate of opinion
does not yet permit an advance 163 comparable to that achieved on the
civil side in this respect, but the Rule should at least tend to allay pre-
vailing doubts whether pre-trial discovery and inspection should be
granted in criminal proceedings at all. Some of these doubts are re-
flected in the rather grudging Committee Note to the Rule.
"Whether under eisting law discovery may be permitted in
criminal cases is doubtful, United States v. Rosenfeld, 57 F. (2d) 74
(C. C. A. 2d)-cert. den., 286 U. S. 556. The courts have, however,
made orders granting to the defendant an opportunity to inspect
impounded documents belonging to him, United States v. 13. Goedde
and Co., 40 Fed. Supp. 523, 534 (E. D. Ill.). The rule is a restate-
ment of this procedure. In addition, it permits the procedure to be
invoked in cases of objects and documents obtained from others by
seizure or by process, on the theory that such evidential matter
would probably have been accessible to the defendant if it had not
previously been seized by the prosecution. The entire matter is
left within the discretion of the court." 16
It is true that motions for discovery and inspection have been un-
familiar to many criminal judges,"6 5 and when made, have more often
than not been viewed as "fishing expeditions" and denied. The sub-
ject has been little treated in legal literature, but there are some inter-
esting federal precedents.
Chief Justice Marshall, in the early case of United States v. Burr 'c
ordered inspection by the defense before trial of a letter in the hands of
the prosecution, on a showing that it might be material to the defense.
To hold otherwise, he felt, would be "a serious blot on the page which
records the judicial proceedings of this country." In United States v.
Rich, 16 an Alaskan case, the court ordered that the defendant be per-
the preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable. The order shall
specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and of taking the
copies or photographs and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just."
163. See Chaplin, Reform in Criminal Procedure (1893) 7 HARv. L. Rnv. 189, 199: "The
old theory was that a prosecution for crime was a contest between the injured person, or his
relatives, and the accused. That theory has gradually yielded to the milder view that the
contest is between the public and the accused. We ought now to be ready for the theory that
a criminal prosecution is not a contest at all, but an investigation, conducted by the State,
before a tribunal of its own appointment, with as great a desire to clear the defendant, if not
guilty, as to convict him, if guilty."
164. NoTEs AND INSTTUTE PROCEEDINGS (1946) 30.
165. As late as 1926, for example, the New York Court of Appeals found it necessary to
examine the problem almost as a new question. People ex rd. Lemon v. Supreme Court,
245 N. Y. 24, 156 N. E. 84,52 A. L. R. 200 (1927). The opinion by Cardozo, C. J., contains
an extended review of the prior Anglo-American history.
166. United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30, No. 14,692d (C. C. D. Va. 1807); United
States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 187, No. 14694 (C. C. D. Va. 1807).
167. 6 Alaska 670, 671 (1922).
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mitted to inspect and photograph a piec.e of glass found near the scene
of the crime and supposedly containing his fingerprints, and observed:
No unfair handicap is imposed on either party by allowing
the other to have full knowledge of inanimate objects intended to be
used in evidence. They are unchangeable, ekcept by destruction or
wilful alteration. . . . The evidence cannot be altered by defend-
ant's prior knowledge, nor can its force be minimized if the theory
of the prosecution be correct. .. ."
The discovery permitted by the Rule is subject to the court's discre-
tion, and is limited to "books, papers, documents or tangible objects,
obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained from others by
seizure or by process. . . ." These need not necessarily constitute evi-
dence, but must be "material to the preparation" of the defense.
A witness' statement made voluntarily and in the possession of the
prosecution is therefore not subject to inspection, not having been ob-
tained "by seizure or by process." Statements or confessions volun-
tarily made by co-defendants and accomplices fall in the same category.
Provision for inspection of the minutes of testimony given by witnesses
before a grand jury is made in Rule 6(e) 16 rather than this one, but the
considerations governing inspection under either Rule are similar.
There is no provision in the Rules for advance disclosure by either
party of the witnesses to be produced at the trial. However, a statute
enacted in 1790 does provide that in treason and other capital cases an
accused may have a list of the jury and of the witnesses to be produced
at the trial."9 In other than capital cases the defendant has no similar
right, though in some instances lists of government witnesses have been
ordered furnished as a matter of discretion,'70 and at least one district
court has made provision for this by local rule.' Unless the govern-
rent's subpoenas are issued in blank, as now authorized by Rule 17(a),
a defendant can, of course, obtain some notice of the witnesses to be
produced against him by watching the praecipes filed with the clerk of
court.
Subpoena. Rule 17, governing subpoenas issued by courts and com-
missioners, is substantially similar to Civil Rule 45(a).
168. See pp. 2034 supra.
169. 1 STAT. 118 (1790), 18 U. S. C. § 562 (1940). Cf. the more generous practice in many
of the States and in England. A. L. I. CODE CRIUM. PROC. (1930) § 194; 11 & 12 Vict., c. 42,
§ 27 (1849). The federal statute does not include the names of additional witnesses who
testified before the grand jury, or on the basis of whose testimony an information was filed.
See Knight v. Hudspeth, 112 F. (2d) 137 (C. C. A. 10th, 1940), cert, denied, 311 U. S. 681
(1940).
170. Spivey v. United States, 109 F. (2d) 181 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940), cer. denied, 310 U. S.
631 (1940); United States v. Aviles, 222 Fed. 474 (S. D. Cal. 1915).
171. D. C. W. D. Wis., Rule 95. See Balliet v. United States, 129 Fed. 689 (C. C. A.
8th, 1904).
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Subdivision (a) includes the new provision relating to subpoenas in
blank:
"The clerk shall issue a subpoena, signed and sealed but otherwise
in blank to a party requesting it, who shall fill in the blanks before
it is served."
This Rule obviously does not favor a policy of enforced disclosure to
the adverse party of the names of the witnesses to be called by either
side.
The right of an indigent defendant to secure the attendance of wit-
nesses at the expense of the government, formerly granted by statute, 2
is preserved and extended by subdivision (b). The right was formerly
limited to witnesses who were within the district or within one hundred
miles of the place of trial, but this restriction has been eliminated. As
formerly, the defendant must show by affidavit the substance of the
testimony which he expects from the witness, that it is material, that he
cannot safely go to trial without the witness, and that he is unable to
pay the witness' fees.
With respect to subpoenas for the production of documents or ob-
jects-the duces tecum-subdivision (c) contains one new provision and
otherwise restates the familiar practice. The new provision is this:
"The court may direct that books, papers, documents or objects
designated in the subpoena be produced before the court at a time
prior to the trial or prior to the time when they are to be offered in
evidence and may upon their production permit the books, papers,
documents or objects or portions thereof to be inspected by the
parties and their attorneys."
This provision invites an exception to the "normal" practice in the
handling of documents produced in response to a subpoena duces tecum.
Normally, "the books and other things called for would merely be
brought into court at the time of the trial, let us say immediately before
they are to be offered in evidence, ... 173 The party calling for the
documents, as well as the court, would then have had no prior oppor-
tunity to examine them. This normal practice makes sense in cases of
no more than average complexity which can in any event be tried in
from one to five days. The common law rules of procedure and of evi-
dence were, of course, developed out of experience with such cases.
Given but a few relevant documents (perhaps a contract or a few
letters), it is perfectly feasible to call for them and see them for the
first time in open court-and for judicial process to absorb the delay
while the party who served the subpoena studies the document to
determine whether the producing party has complied, and whether the
172. 9 STAT 74 (1846), 28 U. S. C. § 656 (1940).
173. Address by Youngquist, NoTEs AND INSTITUTE PROCEEDUMS (1946) 16S.
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document is to be used; or while the court, if there is an objection to
production of a document, studies it to see whether it is relevant, mate-
rial and non-privileged. In federal practice, however, one must also
envisage trials which involve thousands of documents, and consume
many months of trial. Most major anti-trust proceedings are of this
description, as are various classes of cases arising under other industry-
regulation statutes.
The only practicable solution, if such cases are to be tried before
courts, is a subpoena practice which permits of a sifting in advance of
trial of the'documents actually to be offered in evidence. The court can
hardly participate in the preliminary sifting, for the relevance and
materiality of most such documents will be circumstantial, and under
our system of adjudication the court is not supposed to know enough
about the evidence before trial to have an informed judgment on the
circumstantial relevance and materiality of any given bit of proof.
Such practical considerations led the district court in the recent Ameri-
can Tobacco anti-trust case 114 to adopt the very practice since sanc-
tioned by this Rule.
Service of a subpoena, under subdivision (d) of the Rule, may now be
made not only by a marshall or his deputy but "by any other person
who is not a party and who is not less than 18 years of age." 116 In the
interest of getting public jobs done with timing and expedition, this is
an excellent provision. Considering, however, that the marshalls oper-
ate on a fee systenf and that they are not without.political influence in
their localities, this new dispensation will probably not be overworked.
The provision in subdivision (d) that even where the subpoena is
issued at the instance of the government, the person subpoenaed shall
be tendered the fee for one day's attendance and the mileage allowed
by law, is likewise new. Under the former practice a witness had to
finance his own trip, and was reimbursed later. This was all right so
long as the witness actually contrived to show up when needed, but the
writer can recall instances in his own experience of key government
witnesses who were literally without funds to travel and appear, and
had to be tendered their mileage in advance. There is considerable
question whether a subpoena in such a situation would otherwise be
enforceable. Under the new Rule, however, the Department of Justice
174. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F. (2d) 93 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944),
aff'd, 66 Sup. Ct. 1125 (U. S. 1946), approving the district court's procedure in this respect.
175. For prior provisions with respect to persons authorized to serve process, see 48
STAT. 1008 (1934), 5 U. S. C. § 300a (1940); 36 STAT. 1167 (1935), 28 U. S. C. § 503 (1940);
30 STAT. 1237 (1899), 28 U. S. C. § 508 (1940); 29 STAT. 179 (1896), 46 STAT. 486 (1930),
49 STAT. 513 (1935), 28 U. S. C. § 574; 29 STAT. 182 (1896), 35 STAT. 640 (1909), 42 STAT.
615 (1922), 43 STAT. 1029 (1925), 28 U. S. C. § 582 (1940); 1 STAT. 87 (1789), 28 U. S. C.
§ 735 (1940).
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appears to be experiencing real difficulty in finding a way to handle
fhese complicated problems of finance.7
Subpoenas in federal criminal cases run throughout the United States,
as formerly,ln under subdivision (e), and they may likewise be served
abroad pursuant to the Act of July 3, 1926, prompted by the Blackmer
situation.'-,
The issuance of subpoenas for the taking of depositions is governed
by subdivision (f), and substantially follows the civil practice.7 0
Failure to obey a subpoena without adequate excuse--whether issued
by a court or a commissioner-may be punished as a contempt under
subdivision (g).SC
VENUE
District and Division. Rule 18 restates the former general require-
ment that a prosecution be had within the division of the district
wherein the crime was committed.'' The term "prosecution" as here
employed does not include the finding and return of an indictment, so
that the common practice of impaneling one grand jury for the entire
district and distributing the indictments among the divisions in which
the offenses were committed may continue.812 The numerous statutes
dealing with the venue of particular classes of offenses-e.g., continuing
offenses and offenses involving multiple transactions occurring in differ-
ent districts-remain in full force. 
8 3
Transfer within the District. Rule 19, providing that in a district con-
sisting of two or more divisions arraignment may be had, a plea entered,
trial conducted or sentence imposed in any division and at any time if
the defendant consents, is likewise a restatement of former practice. 1 4
176. See 14 U. S. L. WEEa 2679 (U. S. 1946): "The Administrative Assistant to the At-
torney General recently wrote to the Comptroller General of the United States, asking his
'comment or advice' as to the procedure to be followed by the Department of Justice under
the last sentence of R. 17(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.. .. The Attorney
General's office said: 'This requirement presents an almost unvorkable procedure. It would
require that each deputy United States marshall be authorized to carry several hundreds of
dollars of cash at all times, .. ' "
177. 44 STAT. 835-6 (1926), 28 U. S. C. §§ 712-14 (1940).
178. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421 (1932).
179. See Rule 45(d), F. R. Crv. P.
180. A substantially similar provision is found in Civil Rule 45(f). Aith reference to
commissioners, see United States v. Beavers, 125 Fed. 778 (S. D. N. Y. 1903); In re Mason,
43 Fed. 510 (D. Minn. 1890); Ex parte Perkins, 29 Fed. 900 (C. C. D. Ind. 1887); and 24
STAT. 635 (1887), 28 U.-S. C. § 660 (1940).
181. 36 STAT. 1101 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 114 (1940); U. S. Co.sr. Art. III, § 2 and
ASmEND. VI.
182. See Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U. S. 224, 237 (1924).
183. See statutes cited in NOTES To THE RULES OF CRUSNA. PROCnrEDRE FOR Trn
DISrTRCT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (1946) 18-20; Armour Packing Co. v. United
States, 209 U. S. 56, 73-7; United States v. Johnson, 323 U. S. 273 (1944).
184. 36 STAT. 1101 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 114 (1940).
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Transfer from the District for Plea and Sentence. Rule 20 156 author-
izes a new time- and trouble-saving procedure for the benefit of a de-
fendant arrested in a district other than that in which the prosecution
was instituted who desires to plead guilty and have sentence imposed in
the district in which he is found. Adequate protection for the interests
of the government as well as of the defendant without counsel is pro-
vided.
Transfer from the District or Division for Trial. Rule 21 authorizes a
change of venue on motion of the defendant in two situations-if it
appears "that there exists in the district or division where the prosecu-
tion is pending so great a prejudice against the defendant that he can-
not obtain a fair and impartial trial in that district or division," or if it
appears "that the offense was committed in more than one district or
division and if the court is satisfied that in the interest of justice the
proceeding should be transferred to another district or division in which
the commission of the offense is charged."
Both of these provisions, innovations in federal practice, are de-
signed to eliminate some real and some imagined abuses which have
stirred considerable criticism in the past. 8 Change of venue on the
ground of prejudice has long been familiar in the practice of many
states. In some it is available on motion of the prosecution as well as of
the defense. The federal Rule does not go so far since the defendant
has a constitutional right to trial in the district in which the offense was
committed.
The provision for change of venue in prosecutions of offenses com-
mitted in more than one division or district should prove helpful both
to defendants and to the government as well. Its chief application will
be found in anti-trust and other large-scale conspiracy cases. Typically,
in such cases, the offense has been committed throughout the United
185.
"A defendant arrested in a district other than that in which the indictment or in-
formation is pending against him may state in writing, after receiving a copy of the
indictment or information, that he wishes to plead guilty or volo contendere, to
waive trial in the district in which the indictment or information is pending and to
consent to disposition of the case in the district in which he was arrested, subject
to the approval of the United States attorney for each district. Upon receipt of the
defendant's statement and of the written approval of the United States attorneys,
the clerk of the court in which the indictment or information is pending shall trans-
mit the papers in the proceeding or certified copies thereof to the clerk of the court
for the district in which the defendant is held and the prosecution shall continue in
that district. If after the proceeding has been transferred the defendant pleads not
guilty, the clerk shall return the papers to the court in which the prosecution was
commenced and the proceedings shall be restored to the docket of that court. The
defendant's statement shall not be used against him unless he was represented by
counsel when it was made."
186. See Cummings, The Third Great Adventure (1943) 29 A. B. A. J. 654, 655; Medalle,
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (1944) 4 LAWYERS GUILD REV. (3) 1, 5.
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States, and the defendants' principal places of business are rarely all
located in the same place. Under these circumstances it is perfectly
possible for the government to "shop around" for an unduly favorable
locality and judge. But there is another aspect of this situation which
has received less mention. The government must select a venue some-
where. Frequently the choice is legitimately circumscribed by circum-
stances of which the public is unaware, such as grand jury and trial
docket congestion in certain districts and the timing of trial terms of
court. Any choice the government makes is likely to be criticized as
unfair by the defense and all who sympathize with it. The new Rule
permits charges of unfair venue to be litigated in court rather than ex-
clusively in the press.
The statute providing for a change of judge on the ground of personal
bias or prejudice m remains unaffected, as does the statute authorizing
change of venue as a matter of right in a limited class of cases.m
Time of Motion to transfer. Rule 22 provides that a motion to trans-
fer may be made at or before arraignment or at such other time as the
court or these Rules prescribe.
TRIAL
Trial by Jury or by the Court. The former law with respect to the
cases in which a defendant is entitled to trial by jury, waiver of jury
trial by the defendant with the approval of the court and consent of the
government, and trial by a jury of less than twelve on stipulation with
the approval of the court, is restated in Rule 23.113 There is, however,
one new feature-the requirement in subdivision (c) that the court
shall, on request, make special findings of fact in a case tried without a
jury.9
0
187. 36 STAT. 1090 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 25 (1940).
188. 47 STAT. 649 (1933), 49 STAT. 427 (1935); 53 STAT. 742 (1939), 18 U. S. C. § 338a
(d)(mailing threatening communications); 48 STAT. 781 (1934), 53 STAT. 743 (1939), 18
U. S. C. § 408d (threatening communications in interstate commerce).
189. See U. S. CoNST. Art. III, § 2, cl. 3, and AAEND. VI; District of Columbia v.
Clawans, 300 U. S. 617 (1937) (petty offenses excepted); Frankfurter and Corcoran, Pelty
Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury (1926) 39 HARv. L. Rnv.
917; cf. address by McLellan, NoTEs AND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS (1946) 172: "Then I got
interested in what -as a petty crime. In the course of the careful investigation that I made
upon that subject I learned that not a single member of the Supreme Court had ever served
a day in jail, otherwise they could not have decided as they did in the Claans case, ...
that an offense punishable by ninety days in jail is a petty offense." See alEo Patton v.
United States, 281 U. S. 276 (1930) (jury of less than twelve on stipulation, and %aiver);
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269 (1942) (waiver).
190. This has been the practice in Connecticut. See State v. Frost, 105 Conn. 326, 135
Atl. 446 (1926). Cf. McLellan, supra note 189, at 173: "1 could have wished that the rule
had given the judge a right in a criminal case to find the facts or not find them, as he himself
thought was all right. We all know, don't we, that when we hear a criminal case tried we
get convinced of the guilt of the defendant or we don't; and isn't it enough if we say guilty or
1947l
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Trial jurors. The first subdivision of Rule 24, governing the exami-
nation of trial jurors,' is similar to Civil Rule 47(a). As Judge Mc-
Lellan has characterized it:
". .. This rule really is a gem. It lets the judge do just as he
pleases." 112
No change in the law is involved, as the practice has in fact varied in
the several districts.
The qualifications and method of selection of prospective jurors are
not covered by these Rules.'93 The problem of method of selection is,
of course, delicate. We favor public participation in judicial process as
an ideal. But the prosecuting attorney wants to win most of his cases;
indeed, his future depends on it. The judge wants an "intelligent and
responsible" jury. The opportunity to serve on juries can be-to per-
sons of uncertain income-a form of political patronage. The net result
is that an agreed formula has yet to be arrived at. The recent decision
of the Supreme Court in the Thel case and the pending issue concerning
"blue-ribbon juries," "I' are of interest in this connection. The fact
that the Thiel decision on jury composition came out of a civil proceed-
ing is probably not a distinguishing feature. Mr. Justice Murphy said
for the majority:
"The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connec-
tion with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contem-
plates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the commu-
nity. Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 130, 61 S. Ct. 164, 165, 85 L.
Ed. 83; Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, 85, 62 S. Ct. 457,
471, 86 L. Ed. 680. This does not mean, of course, that every jury
must contain representatives of all the economic, social, religious,
racial, political and geographical groups of the community; fre-
quently such complete representation would be impossible. But it
does mean that prospective jurors shall be selected by court officials
not guilty, without going through the form of making special findings of facts designed
by the judge-unconsciously of course-to support the conclusions at which he has ar-
rived ..
191.
"The court may permit the defendant or his attorney and the attorney for the
government to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct
the examination. In the latter event the court shall permit the defendant or his at-
torney and the attorney for the government to supplement the examination by such
further inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors
such additional questions by the parties or their attorneys as it deems proper,"
192. McLellan, supra note 189, at 173.
193. See Dession, The New Federal Rides of Criminal Procedure: I (1946) 55 YALE L. J.
694, 704.
194. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 66 Sup. Ct. 984, 985-6 (U. S. 1946); People v. Fay,
296 N. Y. 510, 68 N. E. (2d) 453 (1946), cert. granted sub. nor. Bove v. New York, 67 Sup.
Ct. 102 (U. S. 1946) (blue ribbon jury).
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without systematic and intentional exclusion of any of these groups.
Recognition must be given to the fact that those eligible for jury
service are to be found in every stratum of society. Jury compe-
tence is an individual rather than a group or class matter. That
fact lies at the very heart of the jury system. To disregard it is to
open the door to class distinctions and discriminations which are
abhorrent to the democratic ideals of trial by jury."
The matter of peremptory challenges is dealt with in subdiision (b)
which supersedes 28 U. S. C. § 424.'11 In capital cases the number of
challenges is now equalized so that both the government and the de-
fendant have twenty; in other felony cases the government has six and
the defendant ten; and in misdemeanor cases each side has three. The
Rule continues the former policy of treating multiple defendants as one
for the purpose of reckoning challenges -'-a fiction which the writer
would not defend even on the limited ground of expediency -with one
concession contained in the last sentence of subdivision (b): "If there is
more than one defendant, the court may allow the defendants additional
peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or
jointly." (Italics supplied.)
This concession helps, but the fact remains that to permit joinder of
defendants at all gives the prosecution an advantage justifiable only by
reasons of expediency. Any lawyer who has participated in a trial of
joint defendants knows that defendants in such cases are strategically
handicapped. To allow a few more peremptory challenges might
lengthen a three-month trial by three days, or a one-week trial by a
day.
The former statute authorizing the impaneling of two alternate
jurors in cases prosecuted on indictment 07 is superseded by subdivi-
sion (c), with two changes. The Rule no longer speaks only in terms of
cases prosecuted on indictment but also allows for alternate jhrors in
cases prosecuted on information; and the maximum permissible num-
ber of alternates is increased from two to four. S
195.- 36 STAT. 1166 (1911).
196. Compare McLellan, supra note 189, at 174-5. "The next part of that rule treats of
peremptory challenges .... There is one thing in it that comes down from the old law that
for personal reasons and as a result of personal experience I don't like . .. it requires the
defendants to exercise their peremptory challenges together, and I submit it is wrong that
defendants should be deprived of their challenges if they can't agree upon which jurors are
likely to be unfavorable to them."
197. 47 STAT. 380 (1932), 28 U. S. C. 417a (1940).
198. "The court may direct that not more than 4 jurors in addition to the regular jury
be called and impanelled to sit as alternate jurors. Alternate jurors in the order in which
they are called shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to consider its
verdict, become unable or disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be
drawn in the same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same
examination and challenges, shall take the same oath and shall have the same functions,
1947]
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Both changes were suggested by practical experiences of the sort
encountered in United States v. American Tobacco Company, 9 an anti-
trust case prosecuted on an information and to a jury. From the outset
it was apparent to all concerned that the trial would consume at least
three months, and on the basis of actuarial tables the odds were that of
twelve middle-aged jurors, at least one would sustain a temporarily in-
capacitating illness in the course of that period. Relying on the notion
that courts possess a residual power to mike such procedural adjust-
ments as may be necessary to make judicial process work, the govern-
ment obtained the appointment of two alternates. The defendants took
exception. As it turned out, both alternates had to be used well before
the trial was over, and during the closing hours it was a matter of touch
and go whether or not a non-existent third might be needed to avert a
mistrial. The draftsmen of the statute had, of course, no such situation
in mind, since informations were not commonly used in such cases until
recent years. The Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the District
Court's procedure in impaneling the alternate jurors, and the Supreme
Court did not choose to disturb the result.
200
Judge; Disability. Rule 25 provides for the situation in which the
judge who presided at the trial is unable, by reason of absence, death,
sickness or other disability, to attend to the proceedings after verdict
or finding of guilt. Another judge may take over or, in his discretion,
grant a new trial. 201
E vidence, Proof of Official Record, and Expert Witnesses. Rules 26-28,
dealing with these evidential matters, have already been discussed.0 2
The first contemplates a uniform system of evidence to be developed by
the federal judiciary, with no requirement of conformity to state law.
The second incorporates by reference Civil Rule 44. The third, recog-
nizing the power of a court to appoint expert witnesses of its own selec-
tion, spells out a procedure to govern such appointments, and provides
that "the court may determine the reasonable compensation of such a
witness and direct its payment out of such funds as may be provided by
powers, facilities and privileges as the regular jurors. An alternate juror who does not re-
place a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict. Each
side is entitled to 1 peremptory challenge in addition to those otherwise allowed by law if
I or 2 alternate jurors are to be impanelled, and 2 peremptory challenges if 3 or 4 alternate
jurors are to be impanelled. The additional peremptory challenges may be used against an
alternate juror only, and the other peremptory challenges allowed by these rules may not be
used against an alternate juror."
199. 39 F. Supp. 957 (E. D. Ky. 1941).
200. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F. (2d) 93 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944), aff'd
66 Sup. Ct. 1125 (U. S. 1946).
201. The provision is similar to Civil Rule 63. See also 31 STAT. 270 (1900), 28 U. S. C.
776 (1940) (Bill of exceptions; authentication; signing of by judge).
202. See Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: 1 (1946) 55 YALu L. J.
694, 703-4.
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law." Until recently there were no funds for this purpose, and those
appropriated have been ludicrously inadequate. The procedure mill
probably not be invoked in many types of prosecutions. One may,
however, expect to see it increasingly employed to secure psychiatric
advice as to sentences in the considerable number of cases where such
assistance is needed.
Motion for Acquittal. Under Rule 29 this newly christened motion
takes the place of the former motion for a directed verdict, the change
in language being designed to describe more simply and accurately
what happens when the motion is granted. Neither the grounds for the
motion nor the scope of matters which may be considered are in any
way changed. To remove a doubt which had existed in a few districts,
the Rule now expressly provides that a defendant shall not be deemed
to have rested his case by virtue of having made the motion at the close
of the government's evidence. When the motion is made at the close of
all the evidence, the Rule expressly permits the court to reserve deci-
sion until after verdict. 203 This is the procedure which was adopted by
the district court in the Madison Oil case. 
2 4
Instructions. Rule 30 is patterned on Civil Rule 51, and provides:
"At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the
trial as the court reasonably directs, any party may file written re-
quests that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the
requests. At the same time copies of such requests shall be fur-
nished to adverse parties. The court shall inform counsel of its pro-
posed action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the jury,
but the court shall instruct the jury after the arguments are com-
pleted. No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or
omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires
to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he ob-
jects and the grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given
to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury."
However, the provision in the second sentence for furnishing the ad-
verse party with copies of requests to charge is new. If a court errone-
203.
"RE ERVATION OF DECISION ON MOTION. If a motion for judgment of acquittal is
made at the close of all the evidence, the court may reserve decision on the motion,
submit the case to the jury and decide the motion either before the jury returns a
verdict or after it returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having re-
turned a verdict. If the motion is denied and the case is submitted to the jury, the
motion may be renewed within 5 days after the jury is discharged and may include
in the alternative a motion for a new trial. If a verdict of guilty is returned the
court may on such motion set aside the verdict and order a new trial or enter judg-
ment of acquittal. If no verdict is returned the court may order a new trial or enter
judgment of acquittal."
204. Ex parle United States, 101 F. (2d) 870 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939), a.f'd by an equally
divided court sub o or. United States v. Stone, 308 U. S. 519 (1939).
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ously omits to give a proper requested charge, the adverse party, now
having notice of the situation, may desire to call the court's attention
to the omission in order to avoid error.
Verdict. Rule 31, dealing with the return of the verdict, the proce-
dure in cases of multiple defendants, conviction of a lesser offense, and
the polling of the jury, is a simple restatement of the former law.05
Sealed verdicts are not mentioned, and the matter is thus left to the
discretion of the district courts. Qualified verdicts in cases in which
capital punishment may be imposed remain subject to the former
statutes. 2s
JUDGMENT
The Rules governing proceeding after verdict or finding of guilty
were promulgated by the Court on February 8, 1946.21 Since the en-
abling legislation 208 on which these Rules depended did not require
their submission to Congress, they were not included in the set of rules
reported at the beginning of the regular session on January 3, 1945.
They were, however, prepared together with the other Rules and in the
same manner, and appeared as Rules 34-41 in the June, 1944 Report of
the Advisory Committee. As promulgated by the Court, they are
numbered 32-39.
Sentence and Judgment. Subdivision (a) of Rule 32 works no change
in the law. It provides that sentence shall be imposed without unrea-
sonable delay, that pending sentence the court may commit the defend-
ant or continue or alter the bail, and that before imposing sentence the
court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in
his own behalf and present any information in mitigation of punish-
ment. There was, of course, no question under the former practice that
where sentencing involved discretion-as it usually does-the court
might subpoena witnesses or consider any other evidence bearing on the
appropriate disposition of the case. 29 To recall an example from state
205. See 17 STAT. 198 (1872), 18 U.S. C. § 566 (1940) (Verdicts; several joint defendants);
17 STAT. 198 (1872), 18 U. S. C. § 565 (1940) (Verdicts; less offense than charged), see
Mackett v. United States, 90 F. (2d) 462, 465 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) (poll of jury); Bruce v.
Chestnut Farms Chevy Chase Dairy, 126 F. (2d) 224 (App. D. C. 1942) (Same).
206. See 47 STAT. 326 (1932), 48 STAT. 781 (1934), 18 U. S. C. § 408a (1940) (Kidnapped
persons); 54 STAT. 255 (1940), 18 U. S. C. §412a (1940) (wrecking trains); 35 STAT. 1152
(1909), 18 U. S. C. § 567 (1940) (Verdicts; qualified verdicts).
207. 327 U. S. 825 (1946).
208. See 47 STAT. 904 (1933), 18 U. S. C. § 688 (1940); 55 STAT. 779 (1941), 18 U. S. C.
§ 689 (Supp. 1946); and 56 STAT. 271 (1942), 18 U. S. C. § 682 (Supp. 1946).
209. See United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 155 Fed. 305 (N. D. I11. 1907),
rev'd 167 Fed. 373 (C. C. A. 7th, 1908), cert. denied 212 U. S. 579 (1909). Failure to inquire
-whether defendants have any reason to suggest why sentence should not be imposed has
usually been considered harmless error. See United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.
(2d) 229 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929); Turner v. United States, 66 Fed. 289 (C. C. A. .th, 1895).
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practice, the Loeb-Leopold proceeding in Illinois wherein alienists testi-
fled and Clarence Darrow made his successful plea for the defense was
no trial, but merely a hearing on sentence.
Under subdivision (b) a judgment of conviction must set forth the
plea, the verdict or findings, and the adjudication and sentence. If the
defendant is found not guilty or for any other reason is entitled to be
discharged, judgment is to be entered accordingly.
Subdivision (c), dealing with the pre-sentence investigation, is new.
It provides that the probation service of the court shall make an investi-
gation and report before the imposition of sentence unless the court
otherwise directs. Formerly such investigations and reports were made
only when affirmatively requested by the court.21 The Rule contem-
plates that the report will present an adequate social case history of the
defendant, prescribes the contents generally, and further provides that
the report shall not be submitted to the Court or otherwise disclosed
prior to determination of guilt.
21 '
This provision reflects the growing use of the pre-sentence report.
The 1941 report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts shows that during that year some 60% of all
probationers received for supervision by United States probation offi-
cers had received pre-sentence investigation, and that a standard pro-
cedure for investigating and reporting was being developed.212 The
total number of probation officers serving the United States District
Courts had increased from eight in 1930 to 239 in 1941. But there was
still a great disparity between the various districts with respect to the
use of this facility. In one district in 1941 there were no pre-sentence
investigations reported. In another, such investigations were reported
for only 4.5% of those placed on probation. In others the percentage
ran as high as 96, 98 and 99.
Withdrawal of a plea of guilty is governed by subdivision (d):
"A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere may
210. 46 STAT. 503 (1930), 18 U. S. C. § 727 (1940).
211. The Advisory Committee had recommended that the Rule also provide: "After
determination of the question of guilt the report shall be available, upon such conditions as
the court may impose, to the attorneys for the parties and to such other persons or agencies
having a legitimate interest therein as the court may designate." FrDEaL% RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE ADVIsoRY COMMITTEE (1944), 34. But this provision
was deleted by the Court.
The deleted provision was prompted by two considerations: (1) The defense should
'have notice and an opportunity to controvert or explain false or misleading statements in a
pre-sentence report, since the report may influence the Court's judgment. (2) Such reports
constitute potentially valuable data for criminological research. For a discussion of the pros
and cons of making such reports available, see NOTES AND INSTITUTE PREEINGS (1946)
222-4.
212. AN-NuAL REPORT OF THE DIREcTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIvE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS (1941) 12.
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be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence
is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sen-
tence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the de-
fendant to withdraw his plea." 213
Probation is left as it was by the provision in subdivision (e) that
"after conviction of an offense not punishable by death or by life im-
prisonment, the defendant may be placed on probation as provided by
law." Statutes governing suspension of the imposition or execution of
sentence, and the placing of defendants on probation, therefore remain
in effect.
214
New Trial. The chief new feature in Rule 33 is the provision extend-
ing to two years after final judgment, the time for making a motion for
new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.21 The time
limit had been 60 days after final judgment, except in capital cases.21
The Rule also provides that where an appeal is pending, the court may
grant the motion only on remand of the case-a provision intended to
change the former practice 217 pursuant to which a remand from the
appellate court had to be secured before the motion for new trial was
made in the trial court. The motion may now b6 made without secur-
ing a remand, but if the trial court decides to grant the motion, the re-
mand must then be obtained prior to entry of the order granting the
motion. The purpose is to eliminate the trouble of getting a remand in
those cases wherein the trial court does not propose to grant a new trial.
A motion for new trial based on any grounds other than newly dis-
covered evidence 218 must be made within five days after verdict or
213. Compare former CRIMINAL APPEALs RULE II:
"(1) Motions after verdict or finding of guilt, or to withdraw a plea of guilty, shall
be determined promptly ...
"(4) A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty shall be made within ten (10) days after
entry of such plea and before sentence is imposed. As amended May 31, 1938."
214. 43 STAT. 1259 (1925), 18 U. S. C. § 724 (1940).
215. Compare A. L. I. CODE CRIM. PROC. (1930) § 362 (motion for new trial for newly
discovered evidence may be made within one year after verdict or at a later time if the court
for good cause permits).
216. Rule H (3) of the former CRIMINAL APPEALS RULES.
217. Rule I1 (3) of the former CRIMINAL APPEALS RLEs provided that the trial court
might "entertain the motion only on remand of the case by the appellate court for that
purpose," and that remand might be made "at any time before final judgment." See Evans
v. United States, 122 F. (2d) 461 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941); Flowers v. United&States, 86 F. (2d)
79 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936); and Isgrig v. United States, 109 F. (2d) 131, 134 (C. C. A. 4th,
1940) ("The case will be remanded, however, only if showing is made to the Appellate Court
that the lower court would be justified in granting a new trial.").
218. Grounds for the motion are illustrated by Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78
(1935); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892); Edwards v. United States,7 F.(2d)
357 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925); Chadwick v. United States, 141 Fed. 225 (C. C. A. 6th, 1905).
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finding of guilt or within such further time as the court may fix during
the five-day period.
2 19
As promulgated by the Court, this Rule differs in two important re-
spects from the draft recommended by the Advisory C6mmittee. First,
the Committee had recommended that there be no timg limitation
where the motion is based on newly discovered evidence, having in
mind that the motion is in any event addressed to the discretion of the
court. 20 Secondly, the Court deleted a provision that a motion for a
new trial based "on the ground that the defendant has been deprived of
a constitutional right may be made at any time before or after final
judgment .... ,, 221 Since such an issue may now be raised by habeas
corpus without time limit, 222 the Committee's thought was that there
would be some advantage in permitting the issue to be raised by mo-
tion in the district where the defendant was originally tried, since the
judicial records-and, usually, persons who would have knowledge-
are there. Habeas corpus proceedings must be instituted in the district
where the petitioner is confined, and this is more often than not at some
distance.
A major latent ambiguity in the Rule is to be regretted: its effect,
if any, on the possible availability of relief against a conviction based on
fundamental errors of fact unknown to the trial court at the time, by a
motion in the nature of the common law writ of error corarn nobis.
The Rule does not deal specifically with that pattern of relief. A mo-
tion for new trial is historically distinguishable. But neither do any of
the other Rules specifically recognize or exclude it. As a matter of func-
tional classification it should have been covered here, as the Committee
note to the Second Preliminary Draft of this Rule implicitly recognized:
"No express provision is made with respect either to providing
for relief or to barring relief under the corhimon law writ of error
coram nobis. See Robinson v. Johnston, 118 F. 2d 998 (C. C. A. 9th,
1941), 130 F. 2d 202 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942), remanded on other
grounds, 316 U. S. 649 (1942). See also People v. Reid, 195 Cal. 249
219. Rule II (2), former CaniNAL APPEALs RULEs, required that the motion be made
within 3 days after verdict or finding of guilt.
There is, however, no time limitation on the court's consideration or reconsideration,
of a motion seasonably made. United States v. Smith, 15 U. S. L. NVEER 2050 (C. C. A. 3d,
1946) (district court vacated judgment and granted new trial after affirmance by circuit
court of appeals of judgment of correction and denial of motion for new trial).
220. Mattox v. United States, 146 U. S. 140 (1892); United States v. Hartenfeld, 113 F.
(2d) 359 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940), cert. denied, 311 U. S. 647 (1940).
221. FEDERAL RULEs OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THlE ADVISORY ConTrEe
(1944), Rule 35.
222. Adams v. United States ex rd. McCann, 317 U. S. 269 (1942) (right to counsel);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938) (right to counsel); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101
(1942) (coercion or inducements to enter plea of guilty); Walker v. Johnson, 312 U. S. 275
(1941) (same).
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(1924). See generally Lamb v. Florida, 91 Fla. 396 (1926). Nothing
in the rules limits existing power of the court to grant any type of
relief from judgments or orders which is not expressly provided for
in the rules.". 
221
The ambiguity in the Rule is not inadvertent, but merely reflects
lack of general agreement on an appropriate solution.224 The impor-
tant thing is that the Rule should not be construed as in any way fore-
closing the question.
That an issue so fundamental to a civilized procedural policy can
remain so long unresolved may seem surprising. But the conflict of
values in our culture which it reflects does exist. On the merits, this
writer can suggest no sufficient reason why relief against erroneous
criminal convictions-whether by writ of coram nobis or motion for
new trial-should be barred by time limitations. There are, of course,
the familiar counter-arguments of expediency: (1) Legal relationships
between parties should be definitely settled, in the interest of forward-
looking adjustment. The validity of this proposition is more apparent
in civil litigation involving property rights than in criminal proceedings
where the purpose and effect of a judgment of conviction are to remove
the defendant-more or less-from the community milieu of living and
adjustment. (2) Courts might be flooded with motions from the peni-
tentiaries. And so they might. A similar possibility, however, has
existed for some time with respect to petitions for habeas corpus, but
the unmanageable flood of petitions anticipated after the decisions in
the Waley 225 and Johnson 221 cases did not materialize. In any event a
sifting procedure comparable to that devised for petitions for certiorari
should be possible. (3) With the passage of time, proof may be dissi-
pated, rendering review impracticable. This difficulty is not imaginary,
since we are speaking of cases in which at least two years and frequently
many more have elapsed. But automatically to bar judicial relief in all
223. FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, SECOND PRELI'MINARY DRAFT (Feb.
1944), Note to Rule 35, p. 131. This is the final Committee Note on the subject, the ulti-
mate edition being confined to notes to the rules which were submitted to Congress, and
hence excluding Rules 32-39.
224. See, for example, Moore and Rogers, Federal Relief From Civil Jdgments (1946)
55 YALE L. J. 623:
"Opinion varies sharply concerning the extent to which relief should be
granted from a judgment. This divergence necessarily results from a clash of the
two principles that litigation must terminate within a reasonable time, but that
justice must be accorded the parties. . ....
The article contains an enlightening discussion of the history of the writ of coram obis. Id,.
at-669-74, 688. As indicated in n. 177, at p. 670-1, the Court has left open the question
whether the substance of the writ is available in a federal criminal proceeding.
225. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101 (1942).
226. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 1J. S. 458 (1938).
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these cases merely because determination of the facts will be impracti-
cable in some is a rather large compromise. 2--
Arrest of Judgment. The grounds for arrest of judgment are un-
changed by Rule 34 .22 But, in contrast with the three-day time limita-
tion prescribed by Rule 11 (2) of the former Criminal Appeals Rules, the
motion may now be made within five days after determination of guilt
or within such further time as the court may fix during the five-day
period.
Correction or Reduction of Sentence. Rule 35 provides that an illegal
sentence may, as formerly, be corrected at any time;22 and that a
sentence may be reduced within 60 days after it is imposed, or within
60 days after receipt by the court of a mandate issued upon affirmance
of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within 60 days after
receipt of an order of the Supreme Court denying an application for
certiorari. Formerly the court might reduce a sentence at any time
during the term.
Some such provision was necessary by reason of the general abolition
in Rule 45 (e) of the term of court as a time limitation. The advantage
of this change has recently been under discussion -.2 0 In any event this
227. Compare the discussion of this Rule in NoTEs AND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS (1946)
229-30:
"HoNoRABLE JAmEs V. BEN'nnT: .... I don't know quite how they arrived
at the term of two years. It is not infrequent for one in my business to find out that
people-few people-really are innocent and get into the penitentiary, and they
can't get the case up or get it to attention until some time more than two years. Of
course, in those cases, if they can be brought up, sometimes they are taken care of
by executive clemency.
"HONORABLE ALEXANDER HoLTzoFF: Our Committee in its final report in-
cluded no time limit on the motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. We thought that the sound judgment of the district judge was sufficient
protection against frivolous and ill-founded motions, and actual meritorious mo-
tions for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence are rare, and in
those few cases a time limit was not necessary. However, there was considerable
opposition to having no time limit, and the Supreme Court put the two year time
limit in its final action on the Rules."
228. See Sutton v. U.S., 15 U. S. L. WVEEK 2245 (C. C. A. 5th, 1946) (construing the new
Rule); Mulloney v. United States, 79 F. (2d) 566, 584 (C. C. A. 1st, 1935); Towev. United
States, 238 Fed. 557, 558 (C. C. A. 4th, 1916); United States v. Marrin, 159 Fed. 767, 76S
(E. D. Pa. 1908), aff'd 167 Fed. 951 (C. C. A. 3d, 1909).
229. See 5 LONGSDORF, CYCLOPEDIL OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1929) § 2468.
230. See NoTEs AND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS (1946) 225, 228-9:
"HONORABLE Joma C. Kox: Isn't that unfortunate? Suppose, for example,
that you impose a sentence and then tell the man that if he makes restitution that
you will lighten the sentence somewhat, and he is not able to make the restitution
within the period of 60 days. Is the court then powerless?"
"M. BARRON: Judge Knox's query as to the restitution matter, I think, can
in a measure be met by use of the power of probation. I think it has been done in
many districts. A defendant who is convicted of larceny or embezzlement and is a
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Rule, as well as Rule 32 dealing with sentence and judgment, would
have to be revised should Congress eventually sanction the method of
sentencing proposed in 1942 in the Report to The Judicial Conference of
the Committee on Punishment for Crime and in the accompanying Fed-
eral Corrections Bill. 231 That bill contemplated a sentencing procedure
of three stages in cases where the court proposed in any event to impose
sentence of more than a year: imposition of an "original sentence";
a recommendation, after study and observation of the defendant, by
the Division on Adult Corrections of the Proposed Board of Correc-
tions; and then imposition of a "definite sentence." The proposed Act
would not have reduced the final authority of the courts in the imposi-
tion of sentence, but it was nevertheless effectively opposed by many
district judges.
Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors in the record arising from oversight or
omission may, under Rule 36, be corrected by the court at any time
and after such notice as the court may order. So far as clerical mistakes
are concerned, this is no change.232 Errors "arising from oversight or
omission" could formerly be corrected during the term, at least where
the effect was not to increase the penalty. 233
first offender, with some prospect of making restitution, perhaps can be dealt with
as fairly and efficiently under the probation power, don't you think, Judge Knox?
"HONORABLE JOHN C. KNOX: Imprisonment is sometimes a powerful persua-
sion.
"MR. BARRON: Can't you do it by imposing a sentence for the maximum term?
"HONORABLE JOHN C. KNOx: It can be done in some cases.
"MR. BARRON: Then in those sentences-when I was in the Department, there
was a habit of imposing sentences, by some judges, that struck me as rather unfor-
tunate. The sentence was definite, the probation was definite, but the condition
was most indefinite that the defendant make restitution, without setting any time
or incorporating in the probation order the conditions and time; so apparently the
defendant had until the last day of his probation period to make restitution.
"HONORABLE JAMFs V. BENNETT: I think that is a very healthy rule to limit
the court in its change of sentence to sixty days after the sentence was imposed. In
the first place, it protects the judge from continual importunities while the man is
in the institution. There is a rule to the effect that if the counsel for the defendant
files a petition for a reduction of sentence and that petition is not acted upon, the
judge can act on it any time, regardless of the expiration of the term of court, and
that has resulted in a good deal of importunities to the judge. It amounts some-
times to a sort of bench parole, whereby the judge retains the authority to reduce
the sentence after the man has been committed. That is practiced to a considerable
extent; and it seems to me it is a good thing to have this rule and have it disposed of.
Such instances as Judge Knox recites can be taken care of through probation, execu-
tive clemency or some other means."
231. H. R. No. 2140, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943). Comment (1944) 53 YALE L. J. 773.
232. See Rupinski v. United States, 4 F. (2d) 17, 18 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925); 5 LONrSDORF,
CycLoPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1929) § 2468.
233. See United States v. Benz, 282 U. S. 304, 308 (1931); Ex Parte Lange, 18 Wall.
163, 167 (U. S. 1873).
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APPEAL
Taking Appeal; and Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The procedure
for taking an appeal is considerably simplified by Rule 37, which gov-
ems direct appeals to the Supreme Court, appeals to the circuit courts
of appeal, and petitions for certiorari.
Petitions for allowance of appeal, citations and assignments of error
are abolished by subdivision (a)(1), dealing with the Notice of Ap-
peal. 21 4 The requirement of former Criminal Appeals Rule III that the
notice contain "a succinct statement of the grounds of appeal" is like-
wise omitted.
A further simplification along the same lines is effected by Rule 39
(b) (1) which prescribes that the rules and practice governing the prepa-
ration and form of the record on appeal in civil actions shall apply in
criminal appeals as well. For appeals to the circuit courts of appeals,
this provision eliminates the necessity for a bill of exceptions. 2 2 For
direct appeals to the Supreme Court, it involves the application of so
much of Civil Rule 72 as relates to the preparation and certification of
the record on appeal, and likewise of the pertinent provision of the
Revised Rules of the Supreme Court which Civil Rule 72 itself incor-
porates by reference. 236 Abolition of the bill of exceptions was recom-
mended by the Committee with the thought that sufficient timely in-
formation as to the grounds of an appeal is afforded by the appellant's
brief, and that to require a bill of exceptions is merely to subject parties




"a) TAKiNG APPEAL. (1) Notice of Appeal. An appeal permitted by law from a
district court to the Supreme Court or to a circuit court of appeals is taken by filing
with the clerk of the district court a notice of appeal in duplicate. Petitions for
allowance of appeal, citations and assignments of error in cases governed by these
rules are abolished. The notice of appeal shall set forth the title of the case, the
name and address of the appellant and of appellant's attorney, a general statement
of the offense, a concise statement of the judgment or order, giving its date and any
sentence imposed, the place of confinement if the defendant is in custody and a
statement that the appellant appeals from the judgment or order. If the appeal is
directly to the Supreme Court, the notice shall be accompanied by a jurisdictional
statement as prescribed by the rules of the Supreme Court. The notice of appeal
shall be signed by the appellant or appellant's attorney, or by the clerk if the notice
is prepared by the clerk as provided in paragraph (2) of this subdivision. The du-
plicate notice of appeal and a statement of the docket entries shall be forarded
immediately by the clerk of the district court to the clerk of the appellate court.
Notification of the filing of the notice of appeal shall be given by the clerk by mail.
ing copies thereof to adverse parties, but his failure so to do does not affect the
validity of the appeal."
235. Rules 75 and 76, F. R. Civ. P.
236. Id. Rule 72. See REVISED RULEs OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
(1939), as amended, Rules 8 and 10.
237. Compare A. L. I. CODE CRnB. PRoc. (1930), § 435.
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The time for taking an appeal is increased by subdivision (a)(2) of
Rule 37 from five 21 to ten days. 29 Appeals by the government must,
as formerly, be taken within 30 days after entry of the judgment or
order appealed from.20 The reasons for limiting a defendant to ten
days, or for not having a uniform time period for all appeals, remain
unclear.2 41 The same subdivision does, however, contain a new provi-
sion designed to protect the interests of the defendant without counsel
in this regard:
". .. When a court after trial imposes sentence upon a defend-
ant not represented by counsel, the defendant shall be advised of
his right to appeal and if he so requests, the clerk shall prepare and
file forthwith a notice of appeal on behalf of the defendant. .. ."
The balance of this Rule deals with certiorari. Subdivision (b) (1)
provides that a petition should be made as prescribed in the Supreme
Court's rules, 242 and so works no change in that respect. The time
within which the petition may be made is, however, altered by subdi-
vision (b) (2), as follows:
"Petition for writ of certiorari may be made within 30 days after
entry of the judgment or within such further time not exceeding 30
days as the Court or a justice thereof for cause shown may fix within
the 30-day period following judgment .... ,, 243
The italicized provision is new. It is designed to eliminate the difficulty
which sometimes arose by reason of the construction of former Criminal
Appeals Rule 11 to deprive the court of all power to grant extensions.244
Stay of Execution, and Relief Pending Review. Here some important
changes are wrought by Rule 38.
The stay is governed by subdivision (a). As previously, an appeal
238. See Rule III, CRIMINAL APPEALS RULES (1934), 292 U. S. 661, 662.
239.
"(2) Time for Taking Appeal. An appeal by a defendant may be taken within 10
days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from, but if a motion for a new
trial or in arrest of judgment has been made within the 10-day period an appeal
from a judgment of conviction may be taken within 10 days after entry of the order
denying the motion.. .."
240. 56 STAT. 271-2 (1942), 18 U. S. C. § 682 (Supp. 1946). As to the time of appealing
from appealable orders, see United States ex rel. Coy v. United States, 316 U. S. 342 (1942).
241. Compare the recommendation of the circuit court judges that the time periods for
all appeals to the circuit courts in civil cases be made uniform and not to exceed 30 days.
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES (1941) 13.
242. See REVISED RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1939), as
amended, Rules 38 and 39; and Rule 11, CRIMINAL APPEALS RULES, 292 U. S. 661, 664
(1934), as amended Feb. 15, 1943, 318 U. S. 807.
243. Italics supplied.
244. See ROBERTSON AND KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TiE
UNITED STATES (1936) §§ 381, 386.
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automatically stays a sentence of death.2 41 1ith respect to sentences
of imprisonment, however, sentence is now stayed only when the de-
fendant affirmatively elects not to enter on the service of his sentence.
With respect to sentences to pay a fine or a fine and costs, the Rule
substantially restates the former law, 2-0 as follows:
"A sentence to pay a fine or a fine and costs, if an appeal is taken,
may be stayed by the district court or by the circuit court of appeals
upon such terms as the court deems proper. The court may require
the defendant pending appeal to deposit the whole or any part of
the fine and costs in the registry of the district court, or to give bond
for the payment thereof, or to submit to an examination of assets,
and it may make any appropriate order to restrain the defendant
from dissipating his assets."
An order placing a defendant on probation is still automatically stayed
if an appeal is taken.
Applications for bail or other relief-e.g., an extension of time for
docketing the record on appeal-pending review, are governed by sub-
divisions (b) and (c). The first provides that admission to bail upon
appeal or certiorari shall be as provided in these rules-e.g., Rule 46.27
The second incorporates a recommendation made by the Judicial Con-
ference of Senior Circuit Judges in 1941,2s to the effect that where ap-
plication is made to an appellate court or judge for bail pending review
or other relief which might have been granted by the district court, the
application shall be on notice nfid shall recite the facts concerning all
prior applications for the same relief.
Supervision of Appeal, Supervision in the appellate court is gov-
erned by Rule 39. Subdivision (a) substantially restates the former
practice, 24 as follows:
"The supervision and control of the proceedings on appeal shall
be in the appellate court from the time the notice of appeal is filed
with its clerk, except as otherwise provided in these rules. The ap-
pellate court may at any time entertain a motion to dismiss the
appeal, or for directions to the district court, or by any judge in re-
lation to the prosecution of the appeal, including any order fixing
or denying bail."
Subdivision (b)(1), as previously mentioned, -2 1 governs the prepara-
245. See Rule 5, CaNAL APPEALS RULES, 292 U. S. 661, 663 (1934), as amended 311
U. S. 731 (1940).
246. Ibid.
247. Discussed infra pp. 248--i.
248. See REPORT OF THE JUDICAL CONFERENcE OF SENIOR CIRCUrT JUDGEs (1941) 8-9.
This rule had recently been adopted in the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 10th circuits. See FErRL
RuLEs OF CRUmN~AL PROCEDURE, SECOND PRELIMINARY DRAFT (Feb., 1944).
249. See Rule 4, CRmaimAL APPE.ALs RULES of 1934, 292 U. S. 661 (1934).
250. See p. 237 supra.
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tion and form of the record on appeal. Printing of the record on appeal
is governed by Subdivision (b)(2). Given a trial of substantial dura-
tion, this item can run into many thousands of dollars. Laymen are
often surprised that it should be necessary to publish a large book or
series of books in order to have a case reviewed by an appellate court.
Unfortunately there is no positive correllation between ability to pay
such printing bills and the merits of an appeal. The new Rule, how-
ever, does permit the circuit court of appeals to "dispense with the
printing of the record on appeal and review the proceedings on the
typewritten record." 251
The period for docketing the appeal and filing the record with the
appellate Court is set at 40 days from the date of the notice of appeal,
but it is also provided, by subdivision (c), that this time may be ex-
251. This Rule may at least encourage courts to permit review upon a typewritten rec-
ord even though the case is not one in forma pauperis governed by 42 StAT. 666 (1922),
28 U. S. C. § 832 (1940). Compare the local rules of court cited in FEDERAL RuLES OF CRiA1z-
eA. PROCEDURE, SECOND PRELImINARY DRAFT (Feb., 1944), Note to Rule 41 (b)(2), 145.
The first preliminary draft circulated by the Advisory Committee included the following
provision, following the practice adopted in the 3rd and several other circuits:
"Printing. It shall not be necessary to print the record on appeal except that
the appellant shall print, as an appendix to his brief, the judgment appealed from,
any opinion or charge of the court, and such other parts of the record material to
the questions presented as the appellant desires the court to read. The brief of the
appellee shall contain as an appendix such parts of the record as the appellee de-
sires the court to read which have not been printed in the appellant's brief. The ap-
pellant may set forth in an appendix to a reply brief such additional parts of the
record as lie desires the court to read in view of the parts printed by the appellee.
If the appellate court is of opinion that the appellant has failed to print so much of
the record as will adequately present the questions raised by him, it may impose as
costs against him the expense incurred by appellee in printing the omitted matter.
The assessment of costs may be enforced only by the process used for the enforce-
ment of a judgment in a civil action. In specific cases the appellate court may order
additional parts or the whole of the record to be printed."
FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROcEDURE, PRELimiNARY DRAFT (1943) 160; cf., Additional
Statement by Messrs. Dession, Glueck, Orfield, and Wechsler, id. at 258:
"... We think the rule recommended by the Committee desirable in so far as
it simplifies the mechanics of preparing the record on appeal and, in some cases at
least, effects a distribution of cost. We think the rule undesirable in so far as it pro-
duces for the appellate court a record broken into two parts which may be lacking
in internal continuity. A discontinuous record necessarily detracts from the valid-
ity of the picture, inevitably imperfect at best, of what actually happened below.
This is especially unfortunate in criminal cases where the plain error rule has, in our
view, a peculiarly important place. We might, nevertheless, subordinate the vice
of the discontinuous record to the virtue of the appendix form, were it not in our
judgment possible to achieve the virtue without the vice. This result would be at-
tained by a rule providing that the appellant and the appellee shall in turn desig-
nate the portions of the record upon which they rely, with the portions printed in
continuous form in a single book and an apportionment of the cost. We believe
that if the'rule is to lay down a uniform practice, this should be the practice pro-
posed."
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tended by the district court, the appellate court or, if the appellate
court is not in session, any judge thereof for cause shown. With re-
spect to such extensions, existing rules of the circuit courts of appeals
presumably stand.2 52 These time provisions differ from those set by
the former Criminal Appeals Rules. 3
Subdivision (d) re-enacts former Criminal Appeals Rule X,254 cover-
ing the setting of the appeal for argument. The date selected is still to
be at least 30 days after the record is filed but as soon thereafter as the
calendar permits. The calendar preference for criminal cases is also
retained. In view of the discretion these provisions confer on the ap-
pellate court, existing rules of the circuit courts of appeals are pre-
sumably unaffected.
2 55
SUPPLEMENTARY AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Commitment to Awtlher District; Remo-,al. The former procedure 2:5
for removal of a federal offender from the district in which he was
arrested to the district of trial is completely revamped by Rule 40.
The function of removal procedure-like interstate and international
extradition-is to protect an accused from an unwarranted removal to
a distant district. There is no quarrel with that. But the former proce-
dure, as prescribed by statute and interpreted by the courts, in certain
situations created difficulties which appeared unnecessary and irra-
tional in terms of the objective.
Requirement of any removal proceedings at all became a bit ridicu-
lous where a defendant was to be removed merely across the line be-
tween two adjoining districts-as from Brooklyn to Manhattan, Or
from Alexandria, Virginia, to the District of Columbia. Cases are on
record in which such removals have required months and even years..2 1
7
Another source of unwarranted delay has been the occasional prac-
252. The existing rules are cited in FEDERAL RuLEs OF CRIu i, PRocEDunE, SEcoho
PRELunNARY DRAFT (Feb., 1944). Note to Rule 41(c), 145-6.
253. Id. at 146:
"The time for filing the record and docketing the appeal in the circuit court of
appeals is governed by the Criminal Appeals Rules, Rule 8 (Record on Appeal
Without Bill of Exceptions) and Rule 9 (Bill of Exceptions), which require that an
appeal without bill of exceptions must be prepared 'within a time stated' by the
trial judge and forwarded 'promptly' to the appellate court, where the case is to be
'at once set for argument,' and in other cases that the bill of exceptions be sub-
mitted to the trial judge for settlement within 30 days, unless an extension is
granted, and then settled 'as promptly as possible' and transmitted 'forthwith' to
the appellate court."
254. 292 U. S. 661, 665 (1934).
255. Rules of the circuit courts of appeals are cited in FEOEmLU. RuLES OF CnrnuN,%L
PRoCmuRE, SECOND PRELMNARY DRAFT (Feb., 1944), Note to Rule 41(d), 146-7.
256. Removal was governed by 29 STAT. 184 (1896), 18 U. $. C. § 591 (1940).
257. See address by Holtzoff, NOTES AND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS (1946) 131; and
Medalie. id. at 273.
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tice of retrying the issue of probable cause in a removal proceeding even
though the defendant has been indicted by a grand jury in the demand-
ing district."' Probable cause is of course in issue in such proceedings,
and where the demand is based merely on a complaint, there is no rea-
son why the government should not be required to adduce proof of
reasonable cause as well as of identity before obtaining removal to a
distant district. Where a defendant has been indicted, however, feeling
has grown that no retrial of probable cause should be required.
Rule 40 divides all cases in which the accused is arrested in a district
other than that in which the prosecution was instituted into two
groups: those in which the place of arrest is either in another district
of the same state or, if in another state, then less than 100 miles from
the place where the prosecution is pending; and cases in which the ar-
rest occurs in another state at a place more than 100 miles from the
place where the prosecution is pending.
For the first group of cases removal proceedings are no longer neces-
sary. 159 The defendant's right to the usual preliminary hearing upon
258. For decisions dealing with the scope of a removal hearing, and the issues properly
to be considered, see United States ex rel. Kassin v. Mulligan, 295 U. S. 396 (1935); Fetters v.
United States ex rel. Cunningham, 283 U. S. 638 (1931); Morse v. United States, 267 U. S.
80 (1925); Rodman v. Pothier, 264 U. S. 399 (1924); Henry v. Henkel, 235 U. S. 219 (1914);
Tinsley v. Treat, 205 U. S. 20 (1907); Beavers v. Henkel, 194 U. S. 73 (1904).
259. The mode of measuring 100 miles may present some question. See NOTES AND
INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS (1946) 143-5:
"FRED SiRIN: . . . I believe some authorities hold that 100 miles would be
measured by straight line; others hold that it would be the usual distance by rail,
I have heard both views expressed in the Department by different people....
"HONORABLE ALEXANDER HOLTZOFF: Of course, this is a new rule, and there
are no precedents for it. . . . I recall this, however, that there are other statutes
and rules of procedure where distances are mentioned, and my recollection is ...
that the distance is measured by the usual customairily traveled route, the shortest
customarily traveled, and not as the crow flies. I am quite sure we didn't intend the
latter, because if you measure 100 miles as the crow flies, you would introduce a
much longer distance than we ever had in mind ...
"NATHAN APRIL: How about the way that the airplane flies?
"HONORABLE ALEXANDER HoLTzoFF: I don't know.
"FRANK PARKER: Mr. Strne, may I point out that whether it was 100 miles
or not, in the past the Comptroller General issued to the United States Attorney's
office and also the marshal a compilation, as I recall prepared by the War Depart-
ment, which gives you the mileage which will be allowed, for instance, from New
York to Philadelphia-which as I recall is considered to be less than a hundred
miles, to wit, ninety miles. I imagine the practice will grow up for everyone to con-
sult the book ...
"HONORABLE ALEXANDER HOLTZOFF: With all due deference to the Comp-
troller General, his rules are not binding on the Federal courts.
"FRED STaiNE: I think in the case of Philadelphia it will probably give rise to
situations where, if a warrant were issued, you could arrest a man in downtown
New York and take him back. It would be within the ninety miles. Further up
town you would have to have a removal hearing even though he is in the same city."
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arrest is unaffected, but the commissioner or magistrate, if he holds the
defendant, will now bind him over to the district court in which the
prosecution is pending.
For the second group of cases removal proceedings are still necessary.
The evidence the government must produce at the removal hearing will
depend on whether the demand is based on an indictment, an informa-
tion, or a complaint. Given an indictment, proof of identity together
with a certified copy of the indictment will suffice. Otherwise proof of
probable cause to-believe the defendant guilty of the offense charged
must also be produced.2 0
The Rule provides that removal hearings shall be held before a
United States commissioner or federal judge, but changes the former
practice 281 in that it permits discharge of a prisoner only by a judge.
As formerly, only a judge may issue a warrant of removal.
The provisions in the Rule concerning release on bail in the district
of arrest and in the district of trial restate the former practice, as does
the provision permitting a defendant to waive a removal hearing . -2
The statutory denial of appeal from a final order in a habeas corpus
proceeding brought to test the validity of a warrant of removal 23 is
likewise unaffected by the Rule.
Search and Seizure. The former practice in respect of search war-
rants and searches and seizures is substantially restated in Rule 41,
with one minor change. The Rule does not supersede the numerous
statutes governing searches in aid of the enforcement of specific federal
statutes,2 4 but expressly does supersede the general statutory provi-
sions with regard to searches and seizures. - 3 The minor change is the
provision in subdivision (e) that a motion for the return or suppression
of evidence must be made in the district court. Formerly the motion
could also be entertained by a commissioner, subject to review by the
district court.
Criminal Contempt. Rule 42 was included by reason of the Act of
260. Compare the discussion of proof of probable cause in connection vith an informa-
tion supra pp. 0000.
261. See authorities cited supra, notes 256 and 258.
262. United States v. Yarborough, 122 Fed. 293 (W1. D. Va. 1903); Unvermagt v. Benn,
5 F. (2d) 492 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925), cerl. denied, 269 U. S. 566 (1925).
263. 52 STAT. 1232 (1938), 28 U. S. C. § 463 (1940).
264. These are cited in NOTES TO TE RTLES OF CRimw,%L PROCEDURE FOR TnE Dis-
TRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (larch, 1945) 33-34.
265. 40 STAT. 228-9 (1917), 18 U. S. C. §§ 611-6, 620-1, 623-6 (1940); Eee Conyer v.
United States, 80 F. (2d) 292 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935) (to the same effect as subdivision (b) of
the Rule); Dumbra v. United States, 268 U. S. 435 (1925) (to'the same effect as subdhision
(c) of the Rule); Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914); Silverthome Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920), Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 (1925), Gouled v.
United States, 255 U. S. 293 (1921) (motion to suppress or compel the return of evidence
obtained by an illegal search and seizure).
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November 21, 1941,266 which extended the rule-making power of the
Supreme Court to proceedings to punish for criminal contempt. The
Rule 2r does not substantially alter the former law with respect to when
a defendant is entitled to notice and hearing,6 8 nor does it enlarge or
diminish the former right to jury trial. 
2 9
With respect to summary punishment for contempt, subdivision (a)
does, however, clarify the law by limiting the situations in which sum-
mary punishment is permissible to those where the judge "certifies that
he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was
committed in the actual presence of the court." 210
In all others 7 the defendant is entitled to notice and hearing, and,
in the special cases covered by the Norris-La Guardia and Clayton
Acts, to a jury trial. Pursuant to a suggestion made in the McCann
case, 27 the notice requirement is made more specific in subdivision (b),
with a view to diminishing the frequent confusion between criminal and
civil contempt proceedings.Y3 The Rule requires that the notice "shall
266. 55 STAT. 779 (1941), 18 U. S. C. § 689 (Supp., 1946).
267. "(a) SUBMARY DISPOSITION. A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if
the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it
was committed in the actual presence of the court. The order of contempt shall recite the
facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered of record.
(b) DIsPOSITION UPON NOTICE AND HEARING. A criminal contempt except as provided
in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice shall state the time
and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense, and shall
state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe It as such.
The notice shall be given orally by the judge in open court in the presence of the defendant
or, on application of the United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for
that purpose, by an order to show cause or an order of arrest. The defendant is entitled to a
trial by jury in any case in which an act of Congress so provides. He is entitled to itdmission
to bail as provided in these rules. If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism
of a judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial or hearing except with the
defendant's consent. Upon a verdict or finding of guilt the court shall enter an order fixing
the punishment."
268. See 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 28 U. S. C. §§ 386-90 (a) (1940); 47 STAT. 72 (1932),
29 U. S. C. § 111 (1940); Camarota v. United States, 111 F. (2d) 243 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940):
McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 80 F. (2d) 211 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Conley v. United
States, 59 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932); O'Connell v. United States, 40 F. (2d) 201
(C. C. A. 2d, 1930), cert. dismissed 296 U. S. 667 (1935); Savin, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 267
(1889).
269. The defendant is entitled to a trial by jury if the proceeding is one to which 47
STAT. 72 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 111 (1940) (Norris-LaGuardia Act), or 38 SPAT. 738 (1914),
28 U. S. C. § 387 (1940) (Clayton Act) are applicable.
270. Compare Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517, 534 (1925); Ex parle Terry, 128
U. S. 289 (1888).
271. The Rules do not, of course, affect the substantive question as to what varieties of
behavior constitute criminal contempt. Numerous federal statutes defining specific types of
criminal contempt ar cited in NoTES TO THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR TIuE
DISTRIcT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (March, 1945) 35-7.
272. McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 80 F. (2d) 211 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
273. See Nye v. United States, 313 U. S. 33, 42-3 (1941).
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state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the
preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts constituting
the criminal contempt charged and describe it as such." 4
The further provision for cases prosecuted on notice and hearing
that "if the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a
judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial or hearing
except with the defendant's consent" is prompted by the common ex-
perience that uncommonly prejudiced individuals almost invariably
consider themselves impartial. 5
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Presence of the Defendant. At certain stages in a criminal proceeding
a defendant has no right to be present. At others he has the right, but
may waive it. There are also situations in which the validity of the
proceeding depends on his presence. But on several aspects of this
problem the law has been unclear. Rule 43 is intended to deal with the
defendant's presence generally.
As formerly, a defendant in a federal criminal proceeding is entitled
to be present at arraignment, at every stage of the trial 2", including
the impanelling of the jury - and the return of the verdict, and at the
imposition of sentence2"' In the stages not mentioned-e.g., an appli-
cation for a warrant, a grand jury proceeding, and appellate proceed-
ings generally-the Rule confers no right of presence. -  In other than
capital cases the trial may continue to and including the return of
274. Italics supplied.
275. Compare the observations of Chief Justice Taft in Cooke v. United States, 267
U. S. 517, 539 (1925), and 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U. S. C. 112 (1940).
276. U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. V, VI; Diaz v. United States, 223 U. S. 442,455 (1912). Sce
Kanner v. United States, 34 F. (2d) 863 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929) (defendant's right to be pres-
ent at jury view of premises waivable); but cf. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97
(1934) (refusal by state court to permit defendant's presence at jury view of premises
not a denial of due process); Shields v. United States, 273 U. S. 583 (1927) (defendant en-
titled to be present when court gives supplemental instructions or otherwise communicates
with jury); Ah Fook Chang v. United States, 91 F. (2d) 805 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) (same);
Fina v. United States, 46 F. (2d) 643 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931) (same).
277. Lewis v. United States, 146 U. S. 370 (1892) (defendant entitled to be present
during trial of challenges to prospective jurors); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574 (1884) (same,
due process).
278. See Price v. Zerbst, 268 Fed. 72 (N. D. Ga. 1920).
279. No departure from former practice is here involved. Dorodell v. United States,
221 U. S. 375 (1911) (correction of the record by appellate court); Schwab v. Berggren,
143 U. S. 442 (1892) (affirmance of conviction by appellate court); United States ex rel.
Coleman v. Cox, 47 F. (2d) 988 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931) (motion for speedy trial and demurrer
passed on); United States v. Lynch, 132 F. (2d) 111 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1942) (hearings on mo-
tions made prior to or after trial); United States v. Johnson, 129 F. (2d) 954 (C. C. A. 3rd,
1942), aff'd 318 U. S. 189 (1943) (argument by counsel on a question of law in absence of the
jury).
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the verdict if the defendant voluntarily absents himself after the trial
has commenced in his presence.21" A corporation may appear by coun-
sel at all stages of a criminal proceeding for all purposes."'
The provision that in misdemeanor prosecutions the court may,, with
the written consent of the defendant, permit arraignment, plea, trial
and imposition of sentence in the defendant's absence, sanctions a prac-
tice employed in the past. It remains discretionary with the court,
being appropriate chiefly in cases of mala prohibita, or where for other
reasons the hardship or expense involved in a personal appearance
would be excessive.
The last sentence of the Rule expressly provides that the defendant's
presence is not required at a "reduction of sentence" under Rule 35.
This provision was designed to avoid any supposed necessity to bring
a defendant to court from a distant institution when the proposed re-
vision of his sentence is actually to his advantage. The language em-
ployed may prove inartistic, since a reduction of sentence can under
some circumstances work against the interests of a defendant. It may
result in loss of eligibility to parole, in loss of credit on his sentence for
good behavior, 2 2 or transfer from a relatively agreeable federal institu-
tion with a regime calculated for his benefit to a disagreeable and debili-
tating county jail. To avoid prejudice to defendants in such cases, "re-
duction of sentence" will have to be interpreted in the light of all the
attributes of any given disposition.
Assignment of Counsel. The problem of legal representation of de-
fendants is inevitably delicate, given our adversary form of procedure,
the organization of legal service on a predominantly private enterprise
basis, the avoidance of criminal practice (save on behalf of corpora-
tions) by the great majority of the bar, and the fact that most indi-
vidual defendants are without substantial means. In its economic as-
pect, the problem has much in common with that of the distribution of
medical care.
The Sixth Amendment provides that "In all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall enjoy the right . .. to have the assistance of counsel
for his defense." There is no question about this so long as the accused
is able to obtain counsel of his own choice. But suppose that he cannot?
Two values need to be served in this situation: the value of fairness of
trial, and the value of starting the convict on his supposedly rehabili-
280. See Diaz v. United States, 223 U. S. 442, 455 (1912); United States v. Noble, 294
Fed. 689 (D. Mont. 1923), aff'd, 300 Fed. 689 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924); United States v. Barra-
cota, 45 F. Supp. 38 (S. D. N. Y. 1942); United States v. Vassalo, 52 F. (2d) 699 (E. D.
Mich. 1931).
281. See 36 STAT. 1164 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 394 (1940); 2 BisHop, CRIMINAL PROCEDURIP,
(2d ed. 1913) § 950a; United States v. Standard Oil Co., 154 Fed. 728, 730 (W. D. Tenn.
1907).
282. See NoTES AND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS (1946) 234-7.
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tory regime without an experience of discrimination at the outset which
will work against rehabilitation. 2 3 In recent decisions the Supreme
Court has shown a new sensitivity to this problem and manifested its
intent to expand the scope and more concretely to implement the con-
stitutional right to counselY
4
Rule 44 states the practice prescribed in those decisions:
"If the defendant appears in court without counsel, the court
shall advise him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to repre-
sent him at every stage of the proceeding unless he elects to proceed
without counsel or is able to obtain counsel."
The Rule does not entitle an accused to have counsel assigned to
represent him in preliminary proceedings, and it does not meet the prac-
tical problems which arise from the circumstance that assigned counsel,
to date at least, must serve without compensation and without an
allowance for e:-penses.2 5 Creation of a system of salaried public de-
fenders as in many of the states-often proposed for the federal sys-
tem 281-was, of course, outside the scope of judicial rule-making.
283. See comments of Hon. James V. Bennett, id. at 239.
".... There is no complaint that comes to me more frequently than the com-
plaint of prisoners that the counsel that they had was not properly trained, that he
wasn't a good counsel, that he didn't have time to prepare the defense, that he
pleaded him guilty when he didn't want to, just to escape the difficulties of the
trial, and that he advised him incorrectly. I hope that can be overcome through
the public defenders."
284. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275 (1941);
Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 (1942); Adams v. United States ex tel. McCann, 317
U. S. 269 (1942).
Prior to the Johnson decision, supra, assignment of counsel in other than capital cases
was considered discretionary. There were two statutes on the subject. 36 ST.T. 1164 (1911),
28 U. S. C. § 394 (1940) provided that "In all the courts of the United States the parties
may plead and manage their own causes personally, or by the assistance of such counsel
or attorneys at law as, by the rules of the said courts, respectively, are permitted to manage
and conduct causes therein." And REv. ST.AT. § 1034 (1875), 18 U. S. C. § 563 (1940) re-
quired the court to assign counsel in a capital case to represent a defendant upon his request.
285. See comments by Holtzoff, NoTEs AND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS (1946) 239:
". .. I don't know whether it is a problem in the Southern District, but it is
in the District of Columbia. The bar is carrying a very heavy burden. We have a
comparatively small trial bar. there are thousands of lawyers in the District of
Columbia, but most of them work for the Government. ... All local crimes as
well as Federal offenses are tried in the Federal court. It is the person who is
charged with an offense such as burglary, pick-pocketing or robbery who is apt to
be indigent. The result is that a large proportion, possibly a majority, of the de-
fendants in the District of Columbia are defended by assigned counsel getting no
compensation. The amount of work done by each lawyer in proportion to his paid
work is tremendous. They do it without a murmur, but I do think it is a heavy
burden on members of the bar."
286. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTOPNEY GENERA. OF TrnE UNITED STATES (1938)
7-8; id. (1939) 10; id. (1940) 7-8; REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE (1941) 15; id.
(1942) 12. See also Murphy, Public Defender in Federal Courts (1940) 28 GEO. L. J. 937.
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Time. Rule 45 prescribes a uniform method for computing pro-
cedural intervals of time, and is substantially similar to Civil Rule 6.
The chief new feature is the elimination in subdivision (c) of the tern
of court as a measure of or factor affecting the time permitted for the
taking of any procedural step. The Rule supersedes the time provisions
of Rule 13 of the former Criminal Appeals Rules. 7
Bail. Rule 46 governs bail for defendants and material witnesses,
prescribing a uniform, and in some respects simplified, practice.
The right of a defendant to bail before conviction is unchanged.28"
By subdivision (a)(2), bail upon review, which includes both appeal
and certiorari, is to be allowed only "if it appears that the case involves
a substantial question which should be determined by the appellate
court." 289
The practice with respect to bail and commitment of material wit-
nesses is not substantially changed by subdivision (b). 1 It does,
however, expressly provide that a witness committed may be ordered
released "if he has been detained for an unreasonable length of time."
The appropriate amount of bail is governed by subdivision (c),
which states the factors to be considered in determining whether bail
is "excessive" within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.2l These
factors include the nature and circumstances of the offense charged,
the weight of the evidence against the defendant, his financial ability
and his character.
287. 292 U. S. 661, 666 (1934).
288. With subdivision (a)(1) of the Rule compare REV. STAT. § 1015 (1875), 18 U. S. C.
§ 596 (1940) (cases not capital), and REV. STAT. § 1016 (1875), 18 U. S. C. § 597 (1940)
(capital cases).
289. Compare Rule 6 of the former Criminal Appeals Rules, 292 U. S. 663-4 (1934); and
34 STAT. 1246 (1907), 18 U. S. C. § 682 (1940), which provided for the admission of the de-
fendant to bail on his own recognizance pending an appeal taken by the Government. The
final Committee Note to this Rule states that the Rule "does not supersede" 18 U. S. C.,
§ 682. See NOTES TO THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF
THE UNITED STATES (March, 1945) 39.
290. Compare the following superseded provisions: REV. STAT. §§ 879-81 (1875), 24
STAT. 635 (1887), 28 U. S. C., §§ 657-60 (1940).
290. Compare the following superseded -provisions: REV. STAT. § 879-81 (1875), 24
STAT. 635 (1887), 28 U. S. C., §§ 657-660 (1940).
291. For decisions antedating the Rules, in which this question was considered, see
Bennett v. United States, 36 F. (2d) 475 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929); Rossi v. United States, 11 F.
(2d) 264, 265, 267 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); United States v. Motlow, 10 F. (2d) 657 (C. C. A.
7th, 1926).
See also remarks of Mr. Barron, NOTES AND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS (1946) 241;
"The question of bail and what is excessive bail is largely a matter between the
United States Attorney and the court, and there are as many different views as
there are-not as many, no, because I think on the whole our United States At-
torneys are pretty fair. Occasionally you will find an overzealous Assistant who
thinks that $50,000 is the smallest bail that ought to be set.
"... It should be treated in circulars from the Department of Justice to the
United States Attorneys. Those reminders are good, but something that can't be
worked out by rule, and can only be worked out by courts and United States At-
torneys."
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Requirements as to the form and place of deposit of bail are made
uniform by subdivision (d). 2 Execution of a bond is made mandatory,
and both courts and commissioners are expressly authorized to dispense
with sureties or security in their discretion.
Corporate sureties, as before, are regulated by statute.M All other
sureties are required by subdivision (e) to justify by affidavit, and may
be required to make full disclosure of their assets and liabilities. 2
292. Compare 40 STAT. 1148 (1919), 6 U. S. C. § 15 (1940); INSTRUCTIONS TO UNITED
STATES ATToti,,Eys, MA.RSHALs, CLERKS, AND ConnssioNERs (U. S. Dept. Justice 1929)
§ 1565-7.
293. 28 STAT. 279 (1894), 36 STAT. 125 (1909), 6 U.S. C. §§ 6-14 (1940).
294. This provision is similar to A. L. I. CODE CRM. PROC. (1931) § 79; cf. NOTES AND
INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS (1946) 242-3:
"HONORABLE JA3IES V. BENNETT: . . . you will find one fellow who would
advocate some supervision of the bail brokers and the fees that they can charge,
and if I had anything to say about one of the fundamental changes that ought to be
made in the administration of the criminal law, it would go directly to that point.
One of the means whereby we can keep people out of these deplorable jails all over
the country is to change that system and make the fees not what the fellow can pay
when you have got him right there, or some high fee-I think the usual fee through-
out the United States Courts is generally about 10 per cent of the bail; whereas
isn't it true yet . . . that in New York statutes they can't charge more than 3 per
cent? Maybe 5 per cent now, but this rule about 10 per cent generally isn't accepted
all over. They will take away every dime the fellow has got, to pay the fee on the
bond.
"HONORABLE G. AARON YouNGQuisT: I am wondering... whether it would
be within the province of the court to cover this by rule.
"HONORABLE JoHN C. KNOX: That would be pretty difficult to do. The men
who write bail bonds feel that they assume the responsibility, and they think they
have to get high insurance.
"HONORABLE JAmEs V. BENNETT: Didn't you attempt to handle that by court
procedure?
"HoNoRABLE JOHN C. KNox: Yes, but it was very difficult. You see nothing
about it until some big case comes up. They are no doubt shaken down unjustly
in many instances. ....
"HONORABLE JAMES V. BENNETT: I suppose you know . . . they have that
rule that will prevent the bail bond broker from taking some sort of indemnity bond
from the friends of the prisoner. He will give bond for $1,000. He will get an in-
demnity bond from the prisoner's father, and if the bond is forfeited then he pro-
ceeds to levy on the indemnity bond at the first possible moment, because the in-
demnity bond may be very much greater than the amount he had up. That is not
at all infrequent with some of these bail bondsmen.
"Let me say I happened to see, Judge Knox, a report on the collections actually
made on these forfeitures, and as it is now, as I understand it from the Department
of Justice, scarcely 10 per cent of the bail bonds where forfeiture was declared were
actually collected.
"HONORABLE ALEXANDER HOLTZOFF: Doesn't that take in the old forfeitures
during the prohibition era? In current cases it isn't as low as 10 per cent. I know
we had in the Department of Justice a stack of bail bonds written during the prohi-
bition era. They weren't collected. It is not fair to consider those. I think practi-
cally every forfeited bail bond nowadays is collected. That is the advantage of a
1947]
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The procedure for dealing with forfeitures is made more flexible by
subdivision (f).295 Declaration of forfeiture becomes automatic on de-
fault, and the Rule distinguishes between the setting aside of a for-
feiture (e.g., a discharge or release of the liability of a surety before
final adjudication of forfeiture) and remission of a forfeiture (e.g., a
release of a surety after entry of final judgment of forfeiture which
operates either to stay execution or to refund part or all of the collected
penalty). The court's power to set aside or remit a forfeiture is no
longer restricted to non-wilful defaults. ° The Rule also substitutes
for the more cumbersome independent proceeding by scire facias 297 a
simple motion procedure for enforcing forfeited bail bonds."29
The provision for exoneration in subdivision (g) is similar to the
formerly governing statute 29 providing for recordation of the dis-
charge and exoneration of the surety.
Motions. Rule 47 states general requirements "I for all motions, as
follows:
"An application to the court for an order shall be by motion, A
motion other than one made during a trial or hearing shall be in
writing unless the court permits it to be made orally. It shall state
professional bondsman-it relieves the friend who goes on a person's bond, and who
complains if he has to pay the forfeiture, the one who says, 'That means I will have
to mortgage my home. I never realized- this would happen.' The professional
bondsman has got to make good, because he won't be allowed to write bonds in that
district otherwise. . . .The real trouble in collecting is in the case of a bond of a
friend who goes on somebody's bail. We want professional bondsmen.
"HONORABLE.JAMES V. BENNETT: I would like to repeat-the whole procedure
is within the purview of rules-the whole business related to bail is sadly in need of
further study and further investigation for the reasons we have pointed out. Espe-
cially does it need some rule by which the fees could be regulated and to see that
the professional bondsman really does have sureties which he claims he has."
295. Compare the formerly governing statute. REV. STAT. § 1020 (1875), 18 U. S. C.
§ 601 (1940).
296. There is now no time limit on the power of the court to remit a forfeiture. Cf.
Comments of Hon. A. Holtzoff, NOTES AND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS (1946) 244:
"What used to happen heretofore when I was in the Department of Justice was
that bondsmen who produced a defendant after the bond had been forfeited, would
apply for an act of Congress to remit the forfeiture, and we used to have a practice
of not objecting to legislative relief in such cases, except for deducting the addi-
tional expense caused to the government, on the theory that this course was an in-
centive to the'bondsmen after the forfeiture to endeavor to locate the fugitive."
297. See United States v. Mack, 295 U. S. 480, 486 (1935); Western Surety Co. v.
United States, 51 F. (2d) 470 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931), 72 F. (2d) 457 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934).
298. Recommendations for simplifications of the bail bond system along lines similar to
those adopted in this Rule .are contained in Cleveland Foundation, Survey Committee,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND (1922) 212-3.
299. REV. STAT. § 1018'(1875), 18 U. S. C. § 599 (1940).
300. For particular provisions relating to specific motions see Rules 6(b)(2), 12, 14-6,
17(c) and (e), 21-2, 29 and 41(e). See also Rule 49.
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the grounds upon which it is made and shall set forth the relief or
order sought. It may be supported by affidavit."
It thus differs from the corresponding civil rule 11 in authorizing the
court to permit motions before or after trial or hearing to be made
orally, and in not providing that the grounds for a motion shall be
stated "with particularity."
Dismissal. Rule 48 provides:
"(a) BY ATrromiFY FOR GOVERNmENT. The Attorney General or
the United States attorney may by leave of court file a dismissal of
an indictment, information or complaint and the prosecution shall
thereupon terminate. Such a dismissal may not be filed during the
trial without the consent of the defendant.
"(b) By COURT. If there is unnecessary delay in presenting the
charge to a grand jury or in filing an information against a defend-
ant who has been held to answer to the district court, or if there is
unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the court may
dismiss the indictment, information or complaint."
Leave of court for a dismissal-or iwile proseui-by the attorney for
the government, not formerly required 0 -was inserted in this Rule by
the Supreme Court.0 3 The requirement is familiar in many of the
states.30 4 Otherwise the Rule continues former practice.- 3
301. Compare the first sentence of Civil Rule 7(b)(1).
The last sentence of Rule 47 is not designed to encourage "speaking motions," but to
make it clear that affidavits may be used whenever establishment of a fact is appropriate in
connection with a motion. For discussion of the speaking motion in connection with the
civil rules see Clark, Simplifled Pleading (1942) JuticrA AD:4INISTRATIO. MONOGruHS,
Series A, No. 18, 18-9; (1942) 14 RocnY MOUNTAIN L. REv. 131; HoL'rZoFF, NEV FEDE RA l
PROCEDURE AND T E CouRTs (1940) 34; 1 MooRE's FEDERUA PRACTICE (1938) § 12.04
at 645-7.
302. See Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454, 457 (U. S. 1869); Dealy v. United States,
152 U. S. 539 (1894); United States v. Rossi, 39 F. (2d) 432 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930); ,Meyers v.
United States, 36 F. (2d) 859 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929); Milliken v. Stone, 7 F. (2d) 397 (S. D.
N. Y. 1925).
The general practice, however, wmas to secure the approval of the Attorney General
before entering a nolle prosequi. See IN1TRUCTIONS TO UNITED STATES ATroRn' E s, MTAR-
SHALLS, CLERKS, AND COsmhlsSioNERs (U. S. Dept. Justice 1929) § 1137 (Dismissing Crimi-
nal Cases); DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CIRCULARS Nos. 1501, 2466, and 2791; REv. STAT.
§ 362 (1875) 5 U. S. C. § 317 (1940); CumMINGS AND MCFARLmAm, FEDERAL JuSTICE (1937)
486-520.
303. Compare Rule 50, FEDERAL RULE OF CRJIINuA PROCEDURE, REroRT OF T=lE
ADVISORY COMITTEE (1944) 54. A provision in the Committee draft that a dismissal by
the attorney for the government should contain "a statement of the reasons therefor" was
deleted by the Court. This provision had been criticized on the grounds that such state-
ments would tend to become pro forma, and that where another indictment was contem-
plated such a statement might be prejudicial to the governk1ent if it disclosed any veakness
in the former case.
304. See A. L. I. CODE CIM. PROC. (1931), Commentaries, 895-7.
305. The second sentence of subdivision (a) restates the former law. See Confiscation
Cases, 7 Wall. 454,457 (1869); United States v. Shoemaker, 27 Fed. Cas. 1067, No. 16,279
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Service and Filing of Papers. Subdivision (a) of Rule 49 provides
generally that written motions other than those which are heard ex
parte, written notices, designations of record on appeal and similar
papers shall be served on adverse parties.
The mode of service is prescribed in subdivision (b) and follows the
practice in civil actions."' Where a party is represented by an attor-
ney, service should be on the attorney unless the court otherwise
orders."'
Subdivision (c), governing notice of orders, provides that imme-
diately upon the entry of an order made on a written motion subse-
quent to arraignment the clerk shall mail to each party affected thereby
a notice thereof and shall make a note in the docket of the mailing.
803
The filing of papers is covered by subdivision (d), which provides
that papers required to be served shall be filed with the court in the
manner provided in civil actions."
Calendars. Rule 50 provides that the district courts may provide for
placing criminal proceedings upon appropriate calendars, and that
preference shall be given to criminal proceedings as far as practicable.
The Rule states the familiar inherent power of the court over its own
calendars, although as a matter of practice in most districts the assign-
ment of criminal cases for trial is handled by the United States Attor-
ney.
310
Exceptions Unnecessary. Rule 51, which is practically identical with
the corresponding civil rule, 31' provides:
"Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary and
for all purposes for which an exception has heretofore been neces-
sary it is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the
court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which
he desires the court to take or his objection to the action of the
(C. C. Il. 1840). Subdivision (b) restates the inherent power of the court to dismiss a case
for want of prosecution. Ex parte Altman, 34 F. Supp. 106 (S. D. Cal. 1940).
306. Compare Rule 5(b), F. R. Civ. P.
307. Compare In re Hewitt Grocery Co., 33 F. Supp. 493 (D. Conn. 1940). The court
will usually require that an order, disobedience of which is punishable as a contempt, or an
order to show cause why a party should not be punished for contempt, shall be served on
the party himself. See 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) § 505.
308. This subdivision is an adaptation of Rule 77(d), F. R. Civ. P. In a case where
the losing party in reliance on the clerk's obligation to send a notice failed to file a timely
notice of appeal, the court was held properly to have vacated the judgment because of the
clerk's failure and to have entered a new judgment (the term of court had not expired).
Hill v. Hawes, 320 U. S. 520 (1944).
309. Rule 5(d) and (e), F. R. Civ. P. is thus incorporated by reference.
310. NOTES TO THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE
UNITED STATES (March 1945) 42. Compare Rules 40 and 78, F. R. Civ. P.
311. Rule 46, F. R. Civ. P., construed in Ulm v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 115 F.
(2d) 492 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940), and Bucy v. Nevada Construction Co., 125 F. (2d) 213, 218
(C. C. A. 9th, 1942).
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court and the grounds therefor; but if a party has no opportunity
to object to a ruling or order, the absence of an objection does not
thereafter prejudice him."
Many states have similarly abolished the use of exceptions in criminal
and civil proceedings.
312
Harmless Error and Plain Error. Rule 52 states two familiar prin-
ciples:313
"(a) HARMLESS ERROR. Any error, defect, irregularity or v-ari-
ance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.
"(b) PLAIN ERROR. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial
rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the atten-
tion of the court."
The Rule does not undertake to state the criteria of "harmlessness," or
of "affecting substantial rights." These criteria are being currently
debated in a series of cases arising in the Second Circuit.314 Nor does
the Rule provide that plain error shall be noticed.315
Regulation of Conduct in the Court Room. Rule 53 prohibits the
taking of photographs in the court room during the progress of judicial
proceedings or radio broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the
court room. 31 6
312. See the Note to Rule 51, op. cit. supra note 310 at 43.
313. With subdivision (a) compare 40 STAT. 1181 (1919), 28 U. S. C. § 391 (1940); and
REV. STAT. § 1025 (1875), 18 U. S. C. § 556 (1940). With subdivision (b) compare lWiborg v.
United States, 163 U. S. 632,658 (1896); Hemphill v. United States, 112 F. (2d) 505 (C. C. A.
9th, 1940), rev'd 312 U. S. 657 (1941). Rule 27 of the RULEs OF TUE SUPRME COURT pro-
vides that errors not specified will be disregarded "save as the court, at its option, may
notice a plain error not assigned or specified."
314. Kotteakos v. United States, 66 Sup. Ct. 1239 (U. S. 1946); Bihn v. United States,
66 Sup. Ct. 1172 (U. S. 1946); Bollenbach v. United States, 66 Sup. Ct. 402 (U. S. 1946);
United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., Inc., 155 F. (2d) 631 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946).
315. Compare Additional Statement by Messrs. Dession, Glueck, Orfield, and Vechsler,
FEDERAL RiLEs OF CRIMINA . PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT (1943) 255, 259:
"We believe that this rule relaaes the duty of the appellate courts to notice
plain error as that duty has been affirmed by decisions of the Supreme Court (Sher-
win and Sheridan v. United States, 313 U. S. 654; Hemphill v. United States, 311
U. S. 634). Under these decisions, as we understand them, an appellate court is not
merely permitted to notice plain error not assigned; it is obliged to do so. We
think, moreover, that such should be the law, particularly in criminal cases. Ac-
cordingly, the rule should in our view be formulated in mandatory terms... ."
Rule 52(b) is construed in Fisher v. United States, 66 Sup. Ct. 1318 (U. S. 1946).
316. For the Committee history of this Rule see Address by Hon. F. E. Crane, NOTES
AND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS (1946) 254-5.
With reference to the type of abuse of judicial process which this Rule is designed to
circumscribe see Robbins, The Haup iman Trial in the Light of English Criminal Procedure
(1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 301, 304; Report of the Special Committee on Cooperation btween Press,
Radio and Bar, as to Publicity Interfering will Fair Trial of Judicial and Quasi-Judicial
Proceedings (1937) 62 A. B. A. REP. 851, 862-5; (1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 762; (1926) 12 Id. at
488; (1925) 11 Id. at 64.
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This Rule will not eradicate trial by the press in sensational cases,
nor will it resolve the public relations problem of the administration of
justice in our culture. But, as a specific and ad hoc provision, it is
oriented toward those ends.
Application and Exception. Rule 54 deals with the scope and ap-
plication of the Rules 317 and with the definition of terms employed."'
Records. Rule 55 provides that the clerk, of the district court and
each United States Commissioner shall keep such records in criminal
proceedings as the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, with the approval of the Judicial Conference of Senior
Circuit Judges, may prescribe. 19
Courts and Clerks. Rule 56 provides:
"The circuit court of appeals and the district court shall be
deemed always open for the purpose of filing any proper paper, of
issuing and returning process and of making motions and orders.
The clerk's office with the clerk or a deputy in attendance shall be
open during business hours on all days except Sundays and legal
holidays."
The Rule follows the former legislative policy of "avoiding the hard-
ships consequent upon a closing of the court during vacations." 320
"Legal holidays" include Federal holidays as well as holidays pre-
scribed by the laws of the State where the clerk's office is located. 21
Rules of Court. Rule 57 recognizes that local rules of court have their
place. The Federal Rules were never intended or conceived to be a
mere "restatement" of law and practice. Nor was the effort to pre-
scribe every detail. As the Chairman of the Advisory Committee has
expressed it: "Our thought was concentrated throughout not in the
317. See Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (1946) 55 YALi L. J.
694, 702-4.
318. See subdivision (c) of the Rule.
319. Compare Rule 79, F. R. Civ. P. And see NOTES TO THE RUtS or CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (March, 1945) 54-5:
"Subsequently to the effective date of the civil rules, however, the Act es-
tablishing the Administrative Office of the United States Courts became law (Act
of August 7, 1939; 53 STAT. 1223; 28 U. S. C. 444-450). One of the duties of the
Director of that Office is to have charge, under the supervision and direction of the
Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, of all administrative matters relating to the
offices of the clerks and other clerical and administrative personnel of the courts,
28 U. S. C. 446. In view of this circumstance it seemed best not to prescribe the
records to be kept by the clerks of the district courts and by the United States
commissioners, in criminal proceedings, but to vest the power to do so in the Direc-
tor of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts with the approval of
the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges."
320. See Abbott v. Brown, 241 U. S. 606, 611 (1916); 36 STAT, 1088 (1911), 28 U. S. C.
§§ 14-5 (1940).
321. See NOTES TO TnE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF
THE UNITED STATES (March, 1945) 55.
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minutiae of practice but on such rules as will insure all the elements of a
fair trial." 322
The Rule is not, however, intended to encourage the proliferation of
local rules. Too specific local rules have often been promulgated by
district and circuit courts, and then ignored. And these local rules have
never been conveniently accessible to other than local counsel.
Subdivision (a) is therefore concerned to keep local rules consistent
with the general Federal Rules, and to insure their adequate publica-
tion and availability.323 Subdivision (b) suggests their real function:
"If no procedure is specifically prescribed by rule, the court may pro-
ceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules or with any
applicable statute."
Forms. The appendix of twenty-seven forms 324 is described by Rule
58, as follows:
"The forms contained in the Appendix of Forms are illustrative
and not mandatory."
The collection of forms is incomplete. What the forms-and par-
ticularly those for indictments and informations-illustrate, is that
simple modem English may be utilized, assuming that the draftsman
has thought through the law and facts of his case.
E ffective Date, and Title. The effective date of the Rules, as the
formula in Rule 59 worked out, was March 21, 1946. Under the same
Rule, they govern not only cases thereafter commenced, but also "so
far as just and practicable all proceedings then pending."
Rule 60 provides that the Rules may be known and cited as the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
322. Address by Arthur T. Vanderbilt, NOTES AND INSTITUTE PRocEunINs (1946)
111, 117:
"The mere fact that some particular point is not dealt with in the Rules is not
to be taken as proof that the matter was not considered by the Advisory Commit-
tee. Rather, it may be presumed that the matter was e.mmined and that the Com-
mittee came to the conclusion that it should not be treatd with in general rules but
rather by local rules or possibly not at all. Among such topics which seem appro-
priate to local rules are the order in which peremptory challenges shall be adminis-
tered to jurors, the order of the argument of the respective counsel for the parties,
and the like. It was deemed best to leave these matters for regulation by local rules
as minor matters of procedure in which differences would not be particularly disad-
vantageous."
323. The Rule provides:
". .. Copies of all rules made by a district court or by a circuit court of ap-
peals shall upon their promulgation be furnished to the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts. The clerk of each court shall make appropriate arrange-
ments, subject to the approval of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, to the end that all rules made as provided herein be pub-
lished promptly and that copies of them be available to the public."
324. RULES oF CRIINJAL PROCEDURE FOR THE DIsTRICT CounTs OF Tue UNiTED
STATES (1946) 61-91.
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CONCLUSION
Compared with the former practice these Rules are an advance, and
have been generally so received. The conception towards which they
move can be briefly stated: The function of criminal sanctions in any
society is to insure public order in the areas where realization of the
values of the society so requires. Given a democratic orientation and
legal system which places a prime value on the individual, the criminal
law function should be performed with the least possible infliction of
severe deprivations upon individuals, and with the widest possible
participation in the process of decision throughout all phases of admin-
istration.
The advance wrought by the Rules should not be exaggerated. There
is no break with recently established trends. The procedure is not yet
perfected, and still involves compromises. But we are speaking of a
phase of organized human relations. Like other group endeavors to
cope with social friction problems, criminal law administration cannot
far outstrip the dissemination of such science and technology concern-
ing human relations as we now possess. Rule-making in our society
requires wide participation. Rule-adoption depends on wide agreement.
To demand further advance now would have been to forfeit adoption.
The limiting factors which have been mentioned, moreover, probably
assume their maximum proportions in relation to advance in the field
of criminal law. This is the area of human relations in which the ma-
jority respond to minority patterns of behavior which are experienced
as intolerable. Destructive emotions tend to be aroused, and ration-
ality to be strained. The common urge is to have the intolerably be-
having individual out of the way, to be reassured that the behavior
need not have occurred. Interest in the "criminal" from there on, as an
individual, tends to be at a minimum.
Despite all this, the Rules reflect a growing appreciation of the in-
terests of the individual defendant as well as of the government and
the public. Significant new features have been introduced. The simpli-
fication of appeal benefits all parties. The elimination of unwarranted
removal proceedings and of other unnecessary procedural steps and
paper work facilitates administration. The new provisions designed to
avoid unnecessary incarceration pending appearance in the district
court, to insure that defendants without means or without counsel
have an opportunity adequately to present their cases, for the taking
of depositions, and for discovery, substantially improve the position of
the defendant. The comprehensive formulation of the whole procedure
for the first time in a simple, integrated set of rules, should prove an
enormous convenience to courts and counsel. Measured against the
procedures of the states and of other nations, our federal criminal pro-
cedure may now be considered modem.
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We have a code-not a mere restatement; and it is a uniform code
for all federal courts. In view of our common law conditioning, these
novel but fundamental aspects of the Rules should be stressed. The
experience with the Civil Rules as with our various "uniform laws" has
demonstrated the limitations which inhere in the common law empha-
sis. We are unaccustomed to dealing with codes. There is a tendency
to defeat code purpose through failure to interpret particular provisions
in the light of policy as manifested in a code as a whole, and there is a
tendency to defeat uniformity through undue adherence to the diver-
gent rulings on questions of detail which inevitably accumulate in mul-
tiple jurisdictional districts.
Realization of the objectives endorsed by the Rules now rests on the
district judges. Success depends on a full recognition that the policy of
the Rules, which seek to prescribe the basic essentials of a fair proceed-
ing, and avoid detail, is to favor flexibility; and that precedents ante-
dating the Rules are not, generally speaking, pertinent to their inter-
pretation.
